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Abstract
We introduce some new logics of imperfect information by adding atomic for-
mulas corresponding to inclusion and exclusion dependencies to the language
of first order logic. The properties of these logics and their relationships with
other logics of imperfect information are then studied. Furthermore, a game
theoretic semantics for these logics is developed. As a corollary of these
results, we characterize the expressive power of independence logic, thus an-
swering an open problem posed in (Gra¨del and Va¨a¨na¨nen, 2010).
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1. Introduction
The notions of dependence and independence are among the most fun-
damental ones considered in logic, in mathematics, and in many of their ap-
plications. For example, one of the main aspects in which modern predicate
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logic can be thought of as superior to medieval term logic is that the for-
mer allows for quantifier alternation, and hence can express certain complex
patterns of dependence and independence between variables that the latter
cannot easily represent. A fairly standard example of this can be seen in the
formal representations of the notions of continuity and uniform continuity :
in the language of first order logic, the former property can be expressed as
∀x(∀ǫ > 0)(∃δ > 0)∀x′(|x − x′| < δ → |f(x) − f(x′)| < ǫ), while the latter
can be expressed as (∀ǫ > 0)(∃δ > 0)∀x∀x′(|x−x′| < δ → |f(x)−f(x′)| < ǫ).
The difference between these two expressions should be clear: in the first one,
the value of the variable δ is a function of the values of the variables x and
ǫ, while in the second one it is a function of the value of the variable ǫ alone.
This very notion of functional dependence also occurs, at first sight rather
independently, as one of the fundamental concepts of Database Theory, and
in that context it proved itself to be highly useful both for the specification
and study of normal forms and for that of constraints over databases.1
Logics of imperfect information are a family of logical formalisms whose
development arose from the observation that not all possible patterns of de-
pendence and independence between variables may be represented in first
order logic. Among these logics, dependence logic [32] is perhaps the one
most suited for the analysis of the notion of dependence itself, since it isolates
it by means of dependence atoms which correspond, in a very exact sense,
to functional dependencies of the exact kind studied in Database Theory.
The properties of this logic, and of a number of variants and generalizations
thereof, have been the object of much research in recent years, and we can-
not hope to give here an exhaustive summary of the known results. We will
content ourselves, therefore, to recall (in Subsection 2.1) the ones that will
be of particular interest for the rest of this work.
Independence logic [15] is a recent variant of dependence logic. In this
new logic, the fundamental concept that is being added to the first order
language is not functional dependence, as for the case of dependence logic
proper, but informational independence: as we will see, this is achieved by
considering independence atoms y ⊥x z, whose informal meaning corresponds
1We will not discuss these issues in any detail in this work; for a handy reference, we
suggest [7] or any other database theory textbook.
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to the statement “for any fixed value of x, the sets of the possible values for
y and z are independent”. Just as dependence logic allows us to reason
about the properties of functional dependence, independence logic does the
same for this notion. Much is not known at the moment about indepen-
dence logic; in particular, one open problem mentioned in [15] concerns the
expressive power of this formalism over open formulas. As we will see, a
formula in a logic of imperfect information defines, for any suitable model
M , the family of its trumps, that is, the family of all sets of assignments
(teams, in the usual terminology of dependence logic) which satisfy the for-
mula. This differs from the case of first order logic, in which formulas satisfy
or do not satisfy single assignments, and the intuitive reason for this should
be understandable: asking whether a statement such as “the values of the
variables x and y are independent” holds with respect of a single variable
assignment is meaningless, since such an assertion can be only interpreted
with respect to a family of possible assignments. A natural question is then
which families of sets of possible variable assignments may be represented
in terms of independence logic formulas.2 An upper bound for the answer
is in [15] already: all classes of sets of assignments which are definable in
independence logic correspond to second order relations which are express-
ible in existential second order logic. In this work, we will show that this
is also a lower bound : a class of sets of assignments is definable in indepen-
dence logic if and only if it is expressible in existential second order logic.
This result, which we will prove as Corollary 6.3, implies that independence
logic is not merely a formalism obtained by adding an arbitrary, although
reasonable-looking, new kind of atomic formula to the first order language.
It – and any other formalism equivalent to it – is instead a natural upper
bound for a general family of logics of imperfect information: in particular,
if over finite models an arbitrary logic of imperfect information character-
izes only teams which are in NP then, by Fagin’s theorem [10], this logic is
(again, over finite models) equivalent to some fragment of independence logic.
The way in which we reach this result is also perhaps of some interest.
Even though functional dependence and informational independence are cer-
tainly very important notions, they are by no means the only ones of their
2The analogous question for dependence logic was answered in [26], and we will report
that answer as Theorem 2.5 of the present work.
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kind that are of some relevance. In the field of database theory, a great vari-
ety of other constraints over relations3 has indeed been studied. Two of the
simplest such constraints are inclusion dependencies and exclusion dependen-
cies, whose definitions and basic properties we will recall in Subsection 4.1;
then, in Subsections 4.2 and 4.4, we will develop and study the corresponding
logics.4 As we will see, “exclusion logic” is equivalent, in a strong sense, to
dependence logic, while “inclusion logic” is properly contained in indepen-
dence logic but incomparable with dependence logic. Then, in Subsection
4.5, we will consider inclusion/exclusion logic, that is, the logic obtained by
adding atoms for inclusion and exclusion dependencies to the language of
first order logic, and prove that it is equivalent to independence logic.
Section 5 develops a game theoretic semantics for inclusion/exclusion
logic. A game-theoretic semantics assigns truth values to expressions ac-
cording to the properties of certain semantic games (often, but not always,
in terms of the existence of winning strategies for these games). Historically,
the first semantics for logics of imperfect information were of this kind; and
even though, for many purposes, team semantics is a more useful and clearer
formalism, we will see that studying the relationship between game semantics
and team semantics allows us to better understand certain properties of the
semantic rules for disjunction and existential quantification. Then, in Section
6, we examine the classes of teams definable by inclusion/exclusion logic for-
mulas (or equivalently, by independence logic formulas), and we prove that
these are precisely the ones corresponding to second order relations definable
in existential second order logic.
Finally, in the last section we show that, as a consequence of this, some of
the most general forms of dependency studied in database theory are express-
ible in independence logic. This, in the opinion of the author, suggests that
logics of imperfect information (and, in particular, independence logic) may
constitute an useful theoretical framework for the study of such dependencies
and their properties.
3Such constraints are usually called dependencies, for historical reasons; but they need
not correspond to anything resembling the informal idea of dependency.
4Subsection 4.3 briefly considers the case of equiextension dependencies and shows that,
for our purposes, they are equivalent to inclusion dependencies.
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2. Dependence and independence logic
In this section, we will recall a small number of known results about
dependence and independence logic. Some of the basic definitions of these
logics will be left unsaid, as they will be later recovered in a slightly more
general setting in Subsection 3.1. This section and that subsection, taken
together, can be seen as a very quick crash course on the field of logics of
imperfect information; the reader who is already familiar with such logics
can probably skim through most of it, paying however some attention to the
discussion of independence logic of Subsection 2.2, the alternative semantic
rules of Definition 3.7 and the subsequent discussion.
2.1. Dependence logic
Dependence logic [32] is, together with IF logic ([17], [31]), one of the
most widely studied logics of imperfect information. In brief, it can be de-
scribed as the extension of first order logic obtained by adding dependence
atoms =(t1 . . . tn) to its language, with the informal meaning of “The value of
the term tn is functionally determined by the values of the terms t1 . . . tn−1”.
This allows us to express patterns of dependence and independence be-
tween variables which are not expressible in first order logic: for example,
in the formula ∀x∃y∀z∃w(=(z, w) ∧ φ(x, y, z, w)) the choice of the value for
the variable w depends only on the value of the variable w, and not from
the values of the variables x and y - or, in other words, this expression is
equivalent to the branching quantifier ([16]) sentence(
∀x ∃y
∀z ∃w
)
φ(x, y, z, w)
and the corresponding Skolem normal form is ∃f∃g∀x∀zφ(x, f(x), z, g(z)).
The idea of allowing more general patterns of dependence and indepen-
dence between quantifiers than the ones permitted in first order logic was,
historically, the main reason for the development of logics of imperfect in-
formation: in particular, [17] argues that the restriction on these patterns
forced by first order logic has little justification, and that hence logics of im-
perfect information are a more adequate formalism for reasoning about the
foundations of mathematics.
No such claim will be made or discussed in this work. But in any
case, the idea of allowing more general patterns of dependence and inde-
pendence between quantifiers seems a very natural one. In IF logic, the
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notion of dependence is, however, inherently connected with the notion of
quantification: for example, the above expression would be written in it as
∀x∃y∀z(∃z/x, y)φ(x, y, z, w), where (∃z/x, y) is to be read as “there exists
a z, independent from x and y, such that . . . ”. Dependence logic and its
variants, instead, prefer to separate the notion of dependency from the no-
tion of quantification: in this second group of logics of imperfect information,
dependence patterns between quantifiers are exactly as first order logic and
our linguistic intuitions would suggest, but dependence atoms may be used
to specify that the value of a certain variable (or, in general, of a certain
term) must be a function of certain other values. This corresponds precisely
to the notion of functional dependence which is one of the central tools of
Database Theory; and indeed, as we will recall later in this work, the satis-
faction conditions for these atoms are in a very precise relationship with the
formal definition of functional dependence.
This, at least in the opinion of the author, makes dependence logic an
eminently suitable formalism for the study of the notion of functional depen-
dence and of its properties; and as we will see, one of the main themes of the
present work will consist in the development and study of formalisms which
have a similar sort of relationship with other notions of dependency.
We will later recall the full definition of the team semantics of dependence
logic, an adaptation of Hodges’ compositional semantics for IF-logic ([21])
and one of the three equivalent semantics for dependence logic described in
[32].5 It is worth noting already here, though, that the key difference between
Hodges semantics and the usual Tarskian semantics is that in the former se-
mantics the satisfaction relation |= associates to every first order model6 M
and formula φ a set of teams, that is, a set of sets of assignments, instead of
just a set of assignments as in the latter one.
As discussed in [22], the fundamental intuition behind Hodges’ semantics
is that a team is a representation of an information state of some agent:
5The readers interested in a more thorough explanation of the team semantics and of
the two game theoretic semantics for dependence logic are referred to [32] itself.
6In all this paper, I will assume that first order models have at least two elements in
their domain.
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given a model M , a team X and a suitable formula φ, the expression
M |=X φ
asserts that, from the information that the “true” assignment s belongs to
the team X , it is possible to infer that φ holds - or, in game-theoretic terms,
that the Verifier has a strategy τ which is winning for all plays of the game
G(φ) which start from any assignment s ∈ X .
The satisfaction conditions for the dependence atom is then given by the
following semantic rule TS-dep:
Definition 2.1 (Dependence atoms). Let M be a first order model, let
X be a team over it, let n ∈ N, and let t1 . . . tn be terms over the signature
of M and with variables in Dom(X). Then
TS-dep: M |=X=(t1 . . . tn) if and only if, for all s, s
′ ∈ X such that ti〈s〉 =
ti〈s
′〉 for i = 1 . . . n− 1, tn〈s〉 = tn〈s
′〉.
This rule corresponds closely to the definition of functional dependency
commonly used in Database Theory ([6]): more precisely, if X(t1 . . . tn) is
the relation {(t1〈s〉, . . . , tn〈s〉) : s ∈ X} then
M |=X=(t1 . . . tn)⇔ X(t1 . . . tn) |= {t1 . . . tn−1} → tn
where the right hand expression states that, in the relation X(t1 . . . tn), the
value of the last term tn is a function of the values of t1 . . . tn−1.
Another formulation of the truth condition of a dependence atom
=(t1 . . . tn), easily seen to be equivalent to this one, is the following: a team
X satisfies such an atom if and only if a rational agent α, whose beliefs
about the identity of the “true” assignment s are described by X , would be
capable of inferring the value of tn from the values of t1 . . . tn−1.
7 A special
case of dependence atom, useful to consider in order to clarify our intuitions,
is constituted by constancy atoms =(t): applying the above definitions, we
can observe that M |=X=(t) if and only if the value t〈s〉 is the same for all
assignments s ∈ X - or, using the agent metaphor, if and only if an agent α
7Decomposing the notion further, this is equivalent to stating that if the values of
t1 . . . tn−1 for the true assignment s ∈ X were announced to the agent then he or she
would also learn the value of tn. The properties of this sort of announcement operators
for dependence logic are discussed in [14].
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as above knows the value of t.8
The following known results will be of some use for the rest of this work:
Theorem 2.2 (Locality [32]). Let M be a first order model and let φ be
a dependence logic formula over the signature of M with free variables in ~v.
Then, for all teams X with domain ~w ⊇ ~v, if X ′ is the restriction of X to ~v
then
M |=X φ⇔M |=X′ φ.
As an aside, it is worth pointing out that the above property does not hold
for most variants of IF -logic: for example, if Dom(M) = {0, 1} and X =
{(x : 0, y : 0), (x : 1, y : 1)} it is easy to see that M |=X (∃z/y)z = y, even
though for the restriction X ′ of X to Free((∃z/y)z = y) = {y} we have that
M 6|=X′ (∃z/y)z = y.
9
Theorem 2.3 (Downwards Closure Property [32]). LetM be a model,
let φ be a dependence logic formula over the signature of M , and let X be
a team over M with domain ~v ⊇ Free(φ) such that M |=X φ. Then, for all
X ′ ⊆ X,
M |=X′ φ.
Theorem 2.4 (Dependence logic sentences and Σ11 [32]). For every de-
pendence logic sentence φ, there exists a Σ11 sentence Φ such that
M |={∅} φ⇔M |= Φ.
Conversely, for every Σ11 sentence Φ there exists a dependence logic sen-
tence φ such that the above holds.
Theorem 2.5 (Dependence logic formulas and Σ11 [26]). For every de-
pendence logic formula φ and every tuple of variables ~x ⊇ Free(φ) there exists
8The existence of a relation between these notions and the ones studied in the field of
epistemic modal logic is clear, but to the knowledge of the author the matter has not yet
been explored in full detail. See [34] for some intriguing reflections about this topic.
9This is a typical example of signalling ([17], [23]), one of the most peculiar and,
perhaps, problematic aspects of IF -logic.
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a Σ11 sentence Φ(R), where R is a |~x|-ary relation which occurs only negatively
in Φ, such that
M |=X φ⇔M |= Φ(Rel(X))
for all teams X with domain ~x.10
Conversely, for all such Σ11 sentences there exists a dependence logic for-
mula φ such that the above holds with respect to all nonempty teams X.
2.2. Independence logic
Independence logic [15] is a recently developed logic which substitutes the
dependence atoms of dependence logic with independence atoms ~t2 ⊥~t1
~t3,
where ~t1 . . .~t3 are tuples of terms (not necessarily of the same length).
The intuitive meaning of such an atom is that the values of the tuples ~t2
and ~t3 are informationally independent for any fixed value of ~t1; or, in other
words, that all information about the value of ~t3 that can be possibly inferred
from the values of ~t1 and ~t2 can be already inferred from the value of ~t1 alone.
More formally, the definition of the team semantics for the independence
atom is as follows:
Definition 2.6 (Independence atoms). LetM be a first order model, let
X be a team over it and let ~t1,~t2 and ~t3 be three finite tuples of terms (not
necessarily of the same length) over the signature of M and with variables
in Dom(X). Then
TS-indep: M |=X ~t2 ⊥~t1
~t3 if and only if for all s, s
′ ∈ X with ~t1〈s〉 =
~t1〈s〉 there exists a s
′′ ∈ X such that ~t1〈s
′′〉~t2〈s
′′〉 = ~t1〈s〉~t2〈s〉 and
~t1〈s
′′〉~t3〈s
′′〉 = ~t1〈s
′〉~t3〈s
′〉.
We refer to [15] for a discussion of this interesting class of atomic formulas
and of the resulting logic. Here we only mention a few results, found in that
paper, which will be useful for the rest of this work:11
10Here Rel(X) is the relation corresponding to the team X , as in Definition 3.2.
11Another interesting result about independence logic, pointed out by Fredrik Engstro¨m
in [9], is that the semantic rule for independence atoms corresponds to that of embedded
multivalued dependencies, in the same sense in which the one for dependence atoms cor-
responds to functional ones.
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Theorem 2.7. Dependence atoms are expressible in terms of independence
atoms: more precisely, for all suitable models M , teams X and terms t1 . . . tn
M |=X=(t1 . . . tn)⇔ M |=X tn ⊥t1...tn−1 tn.
Theorem 2.8. Independence logic is equivalent to Σ11 (and therefore, by
Theorem 2.4, to dependence logic) over sentences: in other words, for ev-
ery sentence φ of independence logic there exists a sentence Φ of existential
second order logic such that
M |={∅} φ⇔M |= Φ.
and for every such Φ there exists a φ such that the above holds.
There is no analogue of Theorem 2.3 for independence logic, however, as
the classes of teams corresponding to independence atoms are not necessarily
downwards closed: for example, according Definition 2.6 the formula x ⊥∅ y
holds in the team
{(x : 0, y : 0), (x : 0, y : 1), (x : 1, y : 0), (x : 1, y : 1)}
but not in its subteam {(x : 0, y : 0), (x : 1, y : 1)}.
The problem of of finding a characterization similar to that of Theorem
2.5 for the classes of teams definable by formulas of independence logic was
left open by Gra¨del and Va¨a¨na¨nen, who concluded their paper by stating
that ([15])
The main open question raised by the above discussion is the fol-
lowing, formulated for finite structures:
Open Problem: Characterize the NP properties of teams that
correspond to formulas of independence logic.
In this paper, an answer to this question will be given, as a corollary of
an analogous result for a new logic of imperfect information.
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3. Team semantics
In this section, we will introduce some of the main concepts that we will
need for the rest of this work and then we will test them on a relatively
simple case. Subsection 3.1 contains the basic definitions of team seman-
tics, following for the most part the treatment of [32]; and furthermore, in
this subsection we introduce two variant rules for disjunction and existen-
tial quantification which, as we will later see, will be of significant relevance.
Then, in Subsection 3.2, we will begin our investigations by examining con-
stancy logic, that is, the fragment of dependence logic obtained by adding
constancy atoms to the language of first order logic. The main result of that
subsection will be a proof that constancy logic is expressively equivalent to
first order logic over sentences, and, hence, that it is strictly less expressive
than the full dependence logic. This particular consequence is a special case
of the far-reaching hierarchy theorem of [8], which fully characterizes the
expressive powers of certain fragments of dependence logic.
3.1. First order (team) logic, in two flavors
In this subsection, we will present and briefly discuss the team semantics
for first order logic, laying the groundwork for reasoning about its extensions
while avoiding, as far as we are able to do so, all forms of semantical ambi-
guity.
As we will see, some special care is required here, since certain rules which
are equivalent with respect to dependence logic proper will not be so with
respect to these new logics. As it often is the case for logics of imperfect in-
formation, the game theoretic approach to semantics (which we will discuss
in Section 5) will be of support and clarification for our intuitions concerning
the intended interpretations of operators.
But let us begin by recalling some basic definitions from [32]:
Definition 3.1 (Team). Let M be a first order model, and let ~v be a tuple
of variables.12 Then a team X for M with domain ~v is simply a set of
12Or, equivalently, a set of variables; but having a fixed ordering of the variables as part
of the definition of team will simplify the definition of the correspondence between teams
and relations. With an abuse of notation, we will identify this tuple of variables with the
underlying set whenever it is expedient to do so.
11
assignments with domain ~v over M .
Definition 3.2 (From teams to relations). LetM be a first order model,
X be a team for M with domain ~v, and let ~t = t1 . . . tk be a tuple of terms
with variables in ~v. Then we write X(~t) for the relation
X(~t) = {(t1〈s〉 . . . tk〈s〉) : s ∈ X}.
Furthermore, if ~w is contained in ~v we will write Rel~w(X) for X(~w); and,
finally, if Dom(X) = ~v we will write Rel(X) for Rel~v(X).
Definition 3.3 (Team restrictions). Let X be any team in any model,
and let V be a set of variables contained in Dom(X). Then
X↾V = {s↾V : s ∈ X}
where s↾V is the restriction of s to V , that is, the only assignment s
′ with
domain V such that s′(v) = s(v) for all v ∈ V .
The team semantics for the first order fragment of dependence logic is then
defined as follows:
Definition 3.4 (Team semantics for first order logic ([21], [32])). Let
M be a first order model, let φ be a first order formula in negation normal
form13 and let X be a team over M with domain ~v ⊇ Free(φ). Then
TS-atom: If φ is a first order literal, M |=X φ if and only if, for all assign-
ments s ∈ X , M |=s φ in the usual first order sense;
TS-∨L: If φ is ψ ∨ θ, M |=X φ if and only if there exist two teams Y and Z
such that X = Y ∪ Z, M |=Y ψ and M |=Z θ;
TS-∧: If φ is ψ ∧ θ, M |=X φ if and only if M |=X ψ and M |=X θ;
13Since the negation is not a semantic operation in dependence logic ([2], [27]), it is
useful to assume that all formulas are in negation normal form. It is of course possible to
adapt these definitions to formulas not in negation normal form, but in order to do so for
the cases of dependence or independence logic it would be necessary to define two distinct
relationships |=+ and |=−, as in [32]. Since, for the purposes of this work, this would offer
no significant advantage and would complicate the definitions, it was chosen to avoid the
issue by requiring all formulas to be in negation normal form instead.
12
TS-∃S: If φ is ∃xψ, M |=X φ if and only if there exists a function F : X →
Dom(M) such that M |=X[F/x] ψ, where
X [F/x] = {s[F (s)/x] : s ∈ X}; 14
TS-∀: If φ is ∀xψ, M |=X φ if and only if M |=X[M/x] ψ, where
X [M/x] = {s[m/x] : s ∈ X}.15
Over singleton teams, this semantics coincides with the usual one for first
order logic:
Proposition 3.5 ([32]). Let M be a first order model, let φ be a first order
formula in negation normal form over the signature of M , and let s be an
assignment with Dom(s) ⊇ Free(φ). Then M |={s} φ if and only if M |=s φ
with respect to the usual Tarski semantics for first order logic.
Furthermore, as the following proposition illustrates, the team semantics of
first order logic is compatible with the intuition, discussed before, that teams
represent states of knowledge:
Proposition 3.6 ([32]). Let M be a first order model, let φ be a first order
formula in negation normal form over the signature ofM , and let X be a team
with Dom(X) ⊇ Free(φ). Then M |=X φ if and only if, for all assignments
s ∈ X, M |={s} φ.
16
On the other hand, these two proposition also show that, for first order
logic, all the above machinery is quite unnecessary. We have no need of
carrying around such complex objects as teams, since we can consider any
assignment in a team individually!
Things, however, change if we add dependence atoms =(t1 . . . tn) to our
language, with the semantics of rule TS-dep (Definition 2.1 here). In the
resulting formalism, which is precisely dependence logic as defined in [32],
14Sometimes, we will write X [F1F2 . . . Fn/x1 . . . xn], or even X [~F/~x], as a shorthand for
X [F1/x1][F2/x2] . . . [Fn/xn].
15Sometimes, we will write X [M/x1x2 . . . xn], or even X [M/~x], as a shorthand for
X [M/x1][M/x2] . . . [M/xn].
16In other words, first order formulas are flat in the sense of [32].
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not all satisfaction conditions over teams can be reduced to satisfaction con-
ditions over assignments: for example, a “constancy atom” =(x) holds in
a team X if and only if s(x) = s′(x) for all s, s′ ∈ X , and verifying this
condition clearly requires to check pairs of assignments at least!17
When studying variants of dependence logic, similarly, it is necessary
to keep in mind that semantic rules which are equivalent with respect to
dependence logic proper may not be equivalent with respect to these new
formalisms. In particular, two alternative definitions of disjunction and ex-
istential quantification exist which are of special interest for this work’s pur-
poses:18
Definition 3.7 (Alternative rules for disjunctions and existentials).
Let M , X , φ, ψ and θ be as usual. Then
TS-∨S: If φ is ψ ∨ θ, M |=X φ if and only if there exist two teams Y and Z
such that X = Y ∪ Z, Y ∩ Z = ∅, M |=Y ψ and M |=Z θ;
TS-∃L: If φ is ∃xψ, M |=X φ if and only if there exists a function H : X →
P(Dom(M))\∅ such that M |=X[H/x] ψ, where
X [H/x] = {s[m/x] : s ∈ X,m ∈ H(s)}.
The subscripts of ·S and ·L of these rules and of the corresponding ones of
Definition 3.4 allow us to discriminate between the lax operators ∨L and ∃L
and the strict ones ∨S and ∃S. This distinction will be formally justified
in Section 5, and in particular by Theorems 5.10 and 5.11; but even at a
glance, this grouping of the rules is justified by the fact that TS-∨S and TS-
∃S appear to be stronger conditions than TS-∨L and TS-∃L. We can then
define two alternative semantics for first order logic (and for its extensions,
of course) as follows:
Definition 3.8 (Lax semantics). The relation M |=LX φ, where M ranges
over all first order models, X ranges over all teams and φ ranges over all
17That is, all constancy atoms - and, more in general, all dependence atoms - are 2-
coherent but not 1-coherent in the sense of [24].
18The rule TS-∃L is also discussed in [9], in which it is shown that it arises naturally
from treating the existential quantifier as a generalized quantifier ([30], [28]) for dependence
logic.
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formulas with free variables in Dom(X), is defined as the relationM |=X φ of
Definition 3.4 (with additional rules for further atomic formulas as required),
but substituting Rule TS-∃S with Rule TS-∃L.
Definition 3.9 (Strict semantics). The relationM |=SX φ, whereM ranges
over all first order models, X ranges over all teams and φ ranges over all for-
mulas with free variables in Dom(X), is defined as the relation M |=X φ of
Definition 3.4 (with additional rules for further atomic formulas as required),
but substituting Rule TS-∨L with Rule TS-∨S .
For the cases of first order and dependence logic, the lax and strict se-
mantics are equivalent:
Proposition 3.10. Let φ be any formula of dependence logic. Then
M |=SX φ⇔M |=
L
X φ
for all suitable models M and teams φ.
Proof. This is easily verified by structural induction over φ, using the down-
wards closure property (Theorem 2.3) to take care of disjunctions and ex-
istentials (and, moreover, applying the Axiom of Choice for the case of ex-
istentials). We verify the case corresponding to existential quantifications,
as an example: the one corresponding to disjunctions is similar but simpler,
and the the others are trivial.
Suppose that M |=SX ∃xφ: then, by rule TS-∃S , there exists a function
F : X → Dom(M) such thatM |=SX[F/x] φ. Now define the function H : X →
P(Dom(M))\{∅} so that, for all s ∈ X , H(s) = {F (s)}: then X [H/x] =
X [F/x], and therefore by induction hypothesis M |=LX[H/x] φ, and hence
by rule TS-∃L M |=
L
X ∃xφ. Conversely, suppose that M |=
L
X ∃xφ: then,
by rule TS-∃L, there exists a function H : X → P(Dom(M))\{∅} such
that M |=LX[H/x] φ. Then, by the Axiom of Choice, there exists a choice
function F : X → Dom(X) such that, for all s ∈ X , F (s) ∈ H(s); therefore,
X [F/x] ⊆ X [H/x] and, by downwards closure, M |=LX[F/x] φ. But then by
induction hypothesis M |=SX[F/x] φ and, by rule TS-∃L, M |=
S
X φ.
As we will argue in Section 4.2, for the logics that we will study for which
a difference exists between lax and strict semantics the former will be the
most natural choice; therefore, from this point until the end of this work the
symbol |= written without superscripts will stand for the relation |=L.
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3.2. Constancy logic
In this section, we will present and examine a simple fragment of depen-
dence logic. This fragment, which we will call constancy logic, consists of all
the formulas of dependence logic in which only dependence atoms of the form
=(t) occur; or, equivalently, it can be defined as the extension of (team) first
order logic obtained by adding constancy atoms to it, with the semantics
given by the following definition:
Definition 3.11 (Constancy atoms). Let M be a first order model, let
X be a team over it, and let t be a term over the signature of M and with
variables in Dom(X). Then
TS-const: M |=X=(t) if and only if, for all s, s
′ ∈ X , t〈s〉 = t〈s′〉.
Clearly, constancy logic is contained in dependence logic. Furthermore, over
open formulas it is more expressive than first order logic proper, since, as
already mentioned, the constancy atom = (x) is a counterexample to Propo-
sition 3.6.
The question then arises whether constancy logic is properly contained
in dependence logic, or if it coincides with it. This will be answered through
the following results:
Proposition 3.12. Let φ be a constancy logic formula, let z be a variable
not occurring in φ, and let φ′ be obtained from φ by substituting one instance
of =(t) with the expression z = t.
Then
M |=X φ⇔M |=X ∃z(=(z) ∧ φ
′).
Proof. The proof is by induction on φ.
1. If the expression =(t) does not occur in φ, then φ′ = φ and we trivially
have that φ ≡ ∃z(=(z) ∧ φ), as required.
2. If φ is =(t) itself then φ′ is z = t, and
M |=X ∃z(=(z) ∧ z = t)⇔ ∃m ∈ Dom(M) s.t. M |=X[m/z] z = t⇔
⇔ ∃m ∈ Dom(M) s.t. t〈s〉 = m for all s ∈ X ⇔ M |=X=(t)
as required, where we used X [m/z] as a shorthand for {s(m/z) : s ∈
X}.
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3. If φ is ψ1∨ψ2, let us assume without loss of generality that the instance
of =(t) that we are considering is in ψ1. Then ψ
′
2 = ψ2, and since z
does not occur in ψ2
M |=X ∃z(=(z) ∧ (ψ
′
1 ∨ ψ2))⇔ ∃m s.t. M |=X[m/z] ψ
′
1 ∨ ψ2 ⇔
⇔ ∃m,X1, X2 s.t. X1 ∪X2 = X,M |=X1[m/z] ψ
′
1 and M |=X2[m/z] ψ2 ⇔
⇔ ∃m,X1, X2 s.t. X1 ∪X2 = X,M |=X1[m/z] ψ
′
1 and M |=X2 ψ2 ⇔
⇔ X1, X2 s.t. X1 ∪X2 = X,M |=X1 ∃z(=(z) ∧ ψ
′
1) and M |=X2 ψ2 ⇔
⇔ X1, X2 s.t. X1 ∪X2 = X,M |=X1 ψ1 and M |=X2 ψ2 ⇔
⇔ M |=X ψ1 ∨ ψ2
as required.
4. If φ is ψ1 ∧ ψ2, let us assume again that the instance of =(t) that we
are considering is in ψ1. Then ψ
′
2 = ψ2, and
M |=X ∃z(=(z) ∧ ψ
′
1 ∧ ψ2)⇔
⇔ ∃m s.t. M |=X[m/z] ψ
′
1 and M |=X[m/z] ψ2 ⇔
⇔M |=X ∃z(=(z) ∧ ψ
′
1) and M |=X ψ2 ⇔
⇔M |=X ψ1 and M |=X ψ2 ⇔
⇔M |=X ψ1 ∧ ψ2.
5. If φ is ∃xψ,
M |=X ∃z(=(z) ∧ ∃xψ
′)⇔
⇔ ∃m s.t. M |=X[m/z] ∃xψ
′ ⇔
⇔ ∃m, ∃H : X [m/z]→ P(Dom(M))\{∅} s.t. M |=X[m/z][H/x] ψ
′ ⇔
⇔ ∃H ′ : X → P(Dom(M))\{∅}, ∃m s.t. M |=X[H′/x][m/z] ψ
′ ⇔
⇔ ∃H ′ : X → P(Dom(M))\{∅} s.t. M |=X[H′/x] ∃z(=(z) ∧ ψ
′)⇔
⇔ ∃H ′ : X → P(Dom(M))\{∅}, s.t. M |=X[H′/x] ψ ⇔
⇔ M |=X ∃xψ.
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6. If φ is ∀xψ,
M |=X ∃z(=(z) ∧ ∀xψ
′)⇔
⇔ ∃m s.t. M |=X[m/z] ∀xψ
′ ⇔
⇔ ∃m s.t. M |=X[m/z][M/x] ψ
′ ⇔
⇔ ∃m s.t. M |=X[M/x][m/z] ψ
′ ⇔
⇔ M |=X[M/x] ∃z(=(z) ∧ ψ
′)⇔
⇔ M |=X[M/x] ψ ⇔
⇔ M |=X ∀xψ.
As a corollary of this result, we get the following normal form theorem for
constancy logic:19
Corollary 3.13. Let φ be a constancy logic formula. Then φ is logically
equivalent to a constancy logic formula of the form
∃z1 . . . zn
(
n∧
i=1
=(zi) ∧ ψ(z1 . . . zn)
)
for some tuple of variables ~z = z1 . . . zn and some first order formula ψ.
Proof. Repeatedly apply Proposition 3.12 to “push out” all constancy
atoms from φ, thus obtaining a formula, equivalent to it, of the form
∃z1(=(z1) ∧ ∃z2(=(z2) ∧ . . . ∧ ∃zn(=(zn) ∧ ψ(z1 . . . zn)))
for some first order formula ψ(z1 . . . zn). It is then easy to see, from the
semantics of our logic, that this is equivalent to
∃z1 . . . zn(=(z1) ∧ . . .∧ =(zn) ∧ ψ(z1 . . . zn))
as required.
19This normal form theorem is very similar to the one of dependence logic proper found
in [32]. See also [8] for a similar, but not identical result, developed independently, which
Arnaud Durand and Juha Kontinen use in that paper in order to characterize the expres-
sive powers of subclasses of dependence logic in terms of the maximum allowed width of
their dependence atoms.
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The following result shows that, over sentences, constancy logic is precisely
as expressive as first order logic:
Corollary 3.14. Let φ = ∃~z (
∧
i =(zi) ∧ ψ(~z)) be a constancy logic sentence
in normal form.
Then φ is logically equivalent to ∃~zψ(~z).
Proof. By the rules of our semantics, M |={∅} ψ if and only if there exists
a family A1 . . . An of nonempty sets of elements in Dom(M) such that, for
X = {(z1 := m1 . . . zn := mn) : (m1 . . .mn) ∈ A1 × . . .× An},
it holds that M |=X ψ. But ψ is first-order, and therefore, by Proposition
3.6, this is the case if and only if for all m1 ∈ A1, . . . , mn ∈ An it holds that
M |={(z1:m1,...zn:mn)} ψ.
But then M |={∅} φ is and only if there exist m1 . . .mn such that this
holds;20 and therefore, by Proposition 3.5, M |={∅} φ if and only if M |=∅
∃z1 . . . znψ(z1 . . . zn) according to Tarski’s semantics, or equivalently, if and
only if M |={∅} ∃z1 . . . znψ(z1 . . . zn) according to team semantics.
Since, by Theorem 2.4, dependence logic is strictly stronger than first order
logic over sentences, this implies that constancy logic is strictly weaker than
dependence logic over sentences (and, since sentences are a particular kind
of formulas, over formulas too).
The relation between first order logic and constancy logic, in conclusion,
appears somewhat similar to that between dependence logic and indepen-
dence logic - that is, in both cases we have a pair of logics which are recip-
rocally translatable on the level of sentences, but such that one of them is
strictly weaker than the other on the level of formulas. This discrepancy be-
tween translatability on the level of sentences and translatability on the level
of formulas is, in the opinion of the author, one of the most intriguing aspects
of logics of imperfect information, and it deserves further investigation.
20Indeed, if this is the case we can just choose A1 = {m1}, . . . , An = {mn}, and con-
versely if A1 . . . An exist with the required properties we can simply select arbitrary ele-
ments of them for m1 . . .mn.
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4. Inclusion and exclusion in logic
This section is the central part of the present work. We will begin it
by recalling two forms of non-functional dependency which have been stud-
ied in Database Theory, and some of their known properties. Then we will
briefly discuss their relevance in the framework of logics of imperfect informa-
tion, and then, in Subsection 4.2, we will examine the properties of the logic
obtained by adding atoms corresponding to the first sort of non-functional
dependency to the basic language of team semantics. Afterward, in Subsec-
tion 4.3 we will see that nothing is lost if we only consider a simpler variant
of this kind of dependency: in either case, we obtain the same logical formal-
ism, which - as we will see - is strictly more expressive than first order logic,
strictly weaker than independence logic, but incomparable with dependence
logic. In Subsection 4.4, we will then study the other notion of non-functional
dependency that we are considering, and see that the corresponding logic is
instead equivalent, in a very strong sense, to dependence logic; and finally,
in Subsection 4.5 we will examine the logic obtained by adding both forms of
non-functional dependency to our language, and see that it is equivalent to
independence logic.
4.1. Inclusion and exclusion dependencies
Functional dependencies are the forms of dependency which attracted
the most interest from database theorists, but they certainly are not the
only ones ever considered in that field.
Therefore, studying the effect of substituting the dependence atoms with
ones corresponding to other forms of dependency, and examining the relation-
ship between the resulting logics, may be - in the author’s opinion, at least -
a very promising, and hitherto not sufficiently explored, direction of research
in the field of logics of imperfect information.21 First of all, as previously
mentioned, teams correspond to states of knowledge. But often, relations
obtained from a database correspond precisely to information states of this
kind;22 and therefore, some of the dependencies studied in database theory
21Apart from the present paper, [9], which introduces multivalued dependence atoms, is
also a step in this direction. The resulting “multivalued dependence logic” is easily seen
to be equivalent to independence logic.
22As a somewhat naive example, let us consider the problem of finding a spy, knowing
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may correspond to constraints over the agent’s beliefs which often occur in
practice, as is certainly the case for functional dependencies.23
Moreover, and perhaps more pragmatically, database researchers have al-
ready performed a vast amount of research about the properties of many
of these non-functional dependencies, and it does not seem unreasonable to
hope that this might allow us to derive, with little additional effort of our
own, some useful results about the corresponding logics.
The present paper will, for the most part, focus on inclusion ([11], [3]) and
exclusion ([4]) dependencies and on the properties of the corresponding logics
of imperfect information. Let us start by recalling and briefly discussing these
dependencies:
Definition 4.1 (Inclusion Dependencies). Let R be a relation, and let
~x, ~y be tuples of attributes of R of the same length. Then R |= ~x ⊆ ~y if and
only if R(~x) ⊆ R(~y), where
R(~z) = {r(~z) : r is a tuple in R}.
In other words, an inclusion dependency ~x ⊆ ~y states that all values taken
by the attributes ~x are also taken by the attributes ~y. It is easy to think up
practical examples of inclusion dependencies: one might for instance think
of the database consisting of the relations (Person, Date of Birth), (Father,
ChildrenF ) and (Mother, ChildrenM ).
24 Then, in order to express the state-
ment that every father, every mother and every child in our knowledge base
are people and have a date of birth, we may impose the restrictions{
Father ⊆ Person, Mother ⊆ Person,
ChildrenF ⊆ Person, ChildrenM ⊆ Person
}
.
that yesterday he took a plane from London’s Heathrow airport and that he had at most
100 EUR available to buy his plane ticket. We might then decide to obtain, from the airport
systems, the list of the destinations of all the planes which left Heathrow yesterday and
whose ticket the spy could have afforded; and this list - that is, the list of all the places
that the spy might have reached - would be a state of information of the kind which we
are discussing.
23For example, our system should be able to represent the assertion that the flight code
always determines the destination of the flight.
24Equivalently, one may consider the Cartesian product of these relations, as per the
universal relation model ([12]).
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Furthermore, inclusion dependencies can be used to represent the assertion
that every child has a father and a mother, or, in other words, that the
attributes ChildrenF and ChildrenM take the same values:
{ChildrenF ⊆ ChildrenM , ChildrenM ⊆ ChildrenF}.
Note, however, that inclusion dependencies do not allow us to express all
“natural” dependencies of our example. For instance, we need to use func-
tional dependencies in order to assert that everyone has exactly one birth
date, one father and one mother:25
{Person→ Date of Birth, ChildrenF → Father, ChildrenM → Mother}.
In [3], a sound and complete axiom system for the implication problem
of inclusion dependencies was developed. This system consists of the three
following rules:
I1: For all ~x, ⊢ ~x ⊆ ~x;
I2: If |~x| = |~y| = n then, for all m ∈ N and all π : 1 . . .m→ 1 . . . n,
~x ⊆ ~y ⊢ xπ(1) . . . xπ(m) ⊆ yπ(1) . . . yπ(m);
I3: For all tuples of attributes of the same length ~x, ~y, and ~z,
~x ⊆ ~y, ~y ⊆ ~z ⊢ ~x ⊆ ~z.
Theorem 4.2 (Soundness and completeness of inclusion axioms [3]).
Let Γ be a set of inclusion dependencies and let ~x, ~y be tuples of relations of
the same length. Then
Γ ⊢ ~x ⊆ ~y
can be derived from the axioms I1, I2 and I3 if and only if all relations
which respect all dependencies of Γ also respect ~x ⊆ ~y.
25The simplest way to verify that these conditions are not expressible in terms of in-
clusion dependencies is probably to observe that inclusion dependencies are closed under
unions : if the relations R and S respect ~x ⊆ ~y, so does R∪S. Since functional dependen-
cies as the above ones are clearly not closed under unions, they cannot be represented by
inclusions.
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However, the combined implication problem for inclusion and functional
dependencies is undecidable ([29], [5]).
Whereas inclusion dependencies state that all values of a given tuple
of attributes also occur as values of another tuple of attributes, exclusion
dependencies state that two tuples of attributes have no values in common:
Definition 4.3 (Exclusion dependencies). Let R be a relation, and let
~x, ~y be tuples of attributes of R of the same length. Then R |= ~x | ~y if and
only if R(~x) ∩R(~y) = ∅, where
R(~z) = {r(~z) : r is a tuple in R}.
Exclusion dependencies can be thought of as a way of partitioning the
elements of our domain into data types, and of specifying which type corre-
sponds to each attribute. For instance, in the example
(Person, Date of birth)× (Father, ChildrenF )× (Mother, ChildrenM )
considered above we have two types, corresponding respectively to people
(for the attributes Person, Father, Mother, ChildrenF and ChildrenM ) and
dates (for the attribute Date of birth). The requirement that no date of
birth should be accepted as a name of person, nor vice versa, can then be
expressed by the set of exclusion dependencies
{A | Date of birth : A = Person,Father,Mother,ChildrenM ,ChildrenF}.
Other uses of exclusion dependencies are less common, but they still exist:
for example, the statement that no one is both a father and a mother might
be expressed as Father | Mother.
In [4], the axiom system for inclusion dependencies was extended to deal
with both inclusion and exclusion dependencies as follows:
1. Axioms for inclusion dependencies:
I1: For all ~x, ⊢ ~x ⊆ ~x;
I2: If |~x| = |~y| = n then, for all m ∈ N and all π : 1 . . .m→ 1 . . . n,
~x ⊆ ~y ⊢ xπ(1) . . . xπ(m) ⊆ yπ(1) . . . yπ(m);
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I3: For all tuples of attributes of the same length ~x, ~y and ~z,
~x ⊆ ~y, ~y ⊆ ~z ⊢ ~x ⊆ ~z;
2. Axioms for exclusion dependencies:
E1: For all ~x and ~y of the same length, ~x | ~y ⊢ ~y | ~x;
E2: If |~x| = |~y| = n then, for all m ∈ N and all π : 1 . . .m→ 1 . . . n,
xπ(1) . . . xπ(m) | yπ(1) . . . yπ(m) ⊢ ~x | ~y;
E3: For all ~x, ~y and ~z such that |~y| = |~z|, ~x | ~x ⊢ ~y | ~z;
3. Axioms for inclusion/exclusion interaction:
IE1: For all ~x, ~y and ~z such that |~y| = |~z|, ~x | ~x ⊢ ~y ⊆ ~z;
IE2: For all ~x, ~y, ~z, ~w of the same length, ~x | ~y, ~z ⊆ ~x, ~w ⊆ ~y ⊢ ~z | ~w.
Theorem 4.4 ([4]). The above system is sound and complete for the impli-
cation problem for inclusion and exclusion dependencies.
It is not difficult to transfer the definitions of inclusion and exclusion de-
pendencies to team semantics, thus obtaining inclusion atoms and exclusion
atoms :
Definition 4.5 (Inclusion and exclusion atoms). LetM be a first order
model, let ~t1 and ~t2 be two finite tuples of terms of the same length over the
signature of M , and let X be a team whose domain contains all variables
occurring in ~t1 and ~t2. Then
TS-inc: M |=X ~t1 ⊆ ~t2 if and only if for every s ∈ X there exists a s
′ ∈ X
such that ~t1〈s〉 = ~t2〈s
′〉;
TS-exc: M |=X ~t1 | ~t2 if and only if for all s, s
′ ∈ X , ~t1〈s〉 6= ~t2〈s
′〉.
Returning for a moment to the agent metaphor, the interpretation of
these conditions is as follows.
A team X satisfies ~t1 ⊆ ~t2 if and only if all possible values that the agent
believes possible for ~t1 are also believed by him or her as possible for ~t2 -
or, by contraposition, that the agent cannot exclude any value for ~t2 which
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he cannot also exclude as a possible value for ~t1. In other words, from this
point of view an inclusion atom is a way of specify a state of ignorance of the
agent: for example, if the agent is a chess player who is participating to a
tournament, we may want to represent the assertion that the agent does not
know whether he will play against a given opponent using the black pieces
or the white ones. In other words, if he believes that he might play against
a given opponent when using the white pieces, he should also consider it
possible that he played against him or her using the black ones, and vice
versa; or, in our formalism, that his belief set satisfies the conditions
Opponent as White ⊆ Opponent as Black,
Opponent as Black ⊆ Opponent as White.
This very example can be used to introduce a new dependency atom
~t1 ⊲⊳ ~t2, which might perhaps be called an equiextension atom, with the
following rule:
Definition 4.6 (Equiextension atoms). LetM be a first order model, let
~t1 and ~t2 be two finite tuples of terms of the same length over the signature
of M , and let X be a team whose domain contains all variables occurring in
~t1 and ~t2. Then
TS-equ: M |=X ~t1 ⊲⊳ ~t2 if and only if X(~t1) = X(~t2).
It is easy to see that this atom is different, and strictly weaker, from the first
order formula
~t1 = ~t2 :=
∧
i
((~t1)i = (~t2)i).
Indeed, the former only requires that the sets of all possible values for ~t1 and
for ~t2 are the same, while the latter requires that ~t1 and ~t2 coincide in all
possible states of things: and hence, for example, the team X = {(x : 0, y :
1), (x : 1, y : 0)} satisfies x ⊲⊳ y but not x = y.
As we will see later, it is possible to recover inclusion atoms from equiex-
tension atoms and the connectives of our logics.
On the other hand, an exclusion atom specifies a state of knowledge. More
precisely, a team X satisfies ~t1 | ~t2 if and only if the agent can confidently
exclude all values that he believes possible for ~t1 from the list of the possible
values for ~t2. For example, let us suppose that our agent is also aware that
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a boxing match will be had at the same time of the chess tournament, and
that he knows that no one of the participants to the match will have the time
to play in the tournament too - he has seen the lists of the participants to
the two events, and they are disjoint. Then, in particular, our agent knows
that no potential winner of the boxing match is also a potential winner of
the chess tournament, even know he is not aware of who these winners will
be. In our framework, this can be represented by stating our agent’s beliefs
respect the exclusion atom
Winner Boxing | Winner Chess.
This is a different, and stronger, condition than the first order expression
Winner Boxing 6= Winner Chess: indeed, the latter merely requires that, in
any possible state of things, the winners of the boxing match and of the chess
tournament are different, while the former requires that no possible winner
of the boxing match is a potential winner for the chess tournament. So, for
example, only the first condition excludes the scenario in which our agent
does not know whether T. Dovramadjiev, a Bulgarian chessboxing champion,
will play in the chess tournament or in the boxing match, represented by the
team of the form
X =
Winner Boxing Winner Chess . . .
s0 T. Dovramadjiev V. Anand . . .
s1 T. Woolgar T. Dovramadijev . . .
. . . . . . . . .
4.2. Inclusion logic
In this section, we will begin to examine the properties of inclusion logic
- that is, the logic obtained adding to (team) first order logic the inclusion
atoms ~t1 ⊆ ~t2 with the semantics of Definition 4.5.
A first, easy observation is that this logic does not respect the downwards
closure property. For example, consider the two assignments s0 = (x : 0, y :
1) and s1 = (x : 1, y : 0): then, for X = {s0, s1} and Y = {s0}, it is easy to
see by rule TS-inc that M |=X x ⊆ y but M 6|=Y x ⊆ y.
Hence, the proof of Proposition 3.10 cannot be adapted to the case of
inclusion logic. The question then arises whether inclusion logic with strict
semantics and inclusion logic with lax semantics are different; and, as the
next two propositions will show, this is indeed the case.
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Proposition 4.7. There exist a model M , a team X and two formulas ψ
and θ of inclusion logic such that M |=LX ψ ∨ θ but M 6|=
S
X ψ ∨ θ.
Proof. Let Dom(M) = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, let X be the team
X =
x y z
s0 0 1 2
s1 1 0 3
s2 4 3 0
and let ψ = x ⊆ y, θ = y ⊆ z.
• M |=LX ψ ∨ θ:
Let Y = {s0, s1} and Z = {s1, s2}. Then Y ∪ Z = X , Y (x) = {0, 1} =
Y (y) and Z(y) = {0, 3} = Z(z).
Hence, M |=LY x ⊆ y and M |=
L
Z y ⊆ z, and therefore M |=
L
X x ⊆
y ∨ y ⊆ z as required.
• M 6|=SX ψ ∨ θ:
Suppose that X = Y ∪ Z, Y ∩ Z = ∅, M |=SX x ⊆ y and M |=
S
Z y ⊆ z.
Now, s2 cannot belong in Y , since s2(x) = 4 and si(y) 6= 4 for all
assignments si; therefore, we necessarily have that s2 ∈ Z. But since
M |=SZ y ⊆ z, this implies that there exists an assignment si ∈ Y such
that si(z) = s2(y) = 3. The only such assignment in X is s1, and
therefore s1 ∈ Y .
Analogously, s0 cannot belong in Z: indeed, s0(y) = 1 6= si(z) for all
i ∈ 0 . . . 2. Therefore, s0 ∈ Y ; and since M |=
S
Y x ⊆ y, there exists an
si ∈ Y with si(y) = s0(x) = 0. But the only such assignment in X is
s1, and therefore s1 ∈ Y .
In conclusion, Y = {s0, s1}, Z = {s1, s2} and Y ∩Z = {s1} 6= ∅, which
contradicts our hypothesis.
Proposition 4.8. There exist a model M , a team X and a formula φ of
inclusion logic such that M |=LX ∃xφ but M 6|=
S
X ∃xφ.
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Proof. Let Dom(M) = {0, 1}, let X be the team
X =
y z
s0 0 1
and let φ be y ⊆ x ∧ z ⊆ x.
• M |=LX ∃xφ:
Let H : X → P(Dom(M)) be such that H(s0) = {0, 1}.
Then
X [H/x] =
y z x
s′0 0 1 0
s′1 0 1 1
and hence X [H/x](y), X [H/x](z) ⊆ X [H/x](x), as required.
• M 6|=SX ∃xψ:
Let F be any function from X to Dom(M). Then
X [F/x] =
y z x
s′′0 0 1 F (s0)
But F (s0) 6= 0 or F (s0) 6= 1; and in the first case M 6|=
S
X[F/x] y ⊆ x,
while in the second one M 6|=SX[F/x] z ⊆ x.
Therefore, when studying the properties inclusion logic it is necessary to
specify whether we are are using the strict or the lax semantics for disjunction
and existential quantification. However, only one of these choices preserves
locality in the sense of Theorem 2.2, as the two following results show:
Proposition 4.9. The strict semantics does not respect locality in inclusion
logic (or in any extension thereof). In other words, there exists a a model
M , a team X and two formulas ψ and θ such that M |=SX ψ ∨ θ, but for
X ′ = X
↾Free(φ∨ψ) it holds that M 6|=
S
X′ ψ ∨ θ instead; and analogously, there
exists a model M , a team X and a formula ξ such that M |=SX ∃xξ, but for
X ′ = X
↾Free(∃xξ) we have that M 6|=
S
X′ ∃ξ instead.
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Proof. 1. Let Dom(M) = {0 . . . 4}, let ψ and θ be x ⊆ y and y ⊆ z
respectively, and let
X =
x y z u
s0 0 1 2 0
s1 1 0 3 0
s2 1 0 3 1
s3 4 3 0 0
Then M |=SX ψ ∨ θ: indeed, for Y = {s0, s1} and Z = {s2, s3} we have
that X = Y ∪ Z, Y ∩ Z = ∅, M |=Y ψ and M |=Z θ, as required.
However, the restriction X ′ of X to Free(ψ ∨ θ) = {x, y, z} is the team
considered in the proof of Proposition 4.7, and - as was shown in that
proof - M 6|=SX ψ ∨ θ.
2. Let Dom(M) = {0, 1}, let ξ be y ⊆ x ∧ z ⊆ x, and let
X =
y z u
s0 0 1 0
s1 0 1 1
Then M |=SX ∃xξ: indeed, for F : X → Dom(M) defined as
F (s0) = 0;
F (s1) = 1;
we have that
X [F/x] =
y z u x
s′0 0 1 0 0
s′1 0 1 1 1
and it is easy to check that this team satisfies ξ. However, the restric-
tion X ′ of X to Free(∃xξ) = {y, z} is the team considered in the proof
of Proposition 4.8, and - again, as shown in that proof - M 6|=SX ∃xψ.
Theorem 4.10 (Inclusion logic with lax semantics is local). LetM be
a first order model, let φ be any inclusion logic formula, and let V be a set
of variables with Free(φ) ⊆ V . Then, for all suitable teams X,
M |=LX φ⇔M |=
L
X↾V
φ
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Proof. The proof is by structural induction on φ.
In Section 4.5, Theorem 4.24, we will prove the same result for an ex-
tension of inclusion logic; so we refer to that theorem for the details of the
proof.
Since, as we saw, inclusion logic is not downwards closed, by Theorem
2.3 it is not contained in dependence logic. It is then natural to ask whether
dependence logic is contained in inclusion logic, or if dependence and inclu-
sion logic are two incomparable extensions of first order logic.
This is answered by the following result, and by its corollary:
Theorem 4.11 (Union closure for inclusion logic). Let φ be any inclu-
sion logic formula, let M be a first order model and let (Xi)i∈I be a family
of teams with the same domain such that M |=Xi φ for all i ∈ I. Then, for
X =
⋃
i∈I Xi, we have that M |=X φ.
Proof. By structural induction on φ.
1. If φ is a first order literal, this is obvious.
2. Suppose thatM |=Xi ~t1 ⊆ ~t2 for all i ∈ I. ThenM |=X ~t1 ⊆ ~t2. Indeed,
let s ∈ X : then s ∈ Xi for some i ∈ I, and hence there exists another
s′ ∈ Xi with s
′(~t2) = s(~t1). Since Xi ⊆ X we then have that s
′ ∈ X ,
as required.
3. Suppose that M |=Xi ψ ∨ θ for all i ∈ I. Then each Xi can be split
into two subteams Yi and Zi with M |=Yi ψ and M |=Zi θ. Now, let
Y =
⋃
i∈I Yi and Z =
⋃
i∈I Zi: by induction hypothesis, M |=Y ψ and
M |=Z θ. Furthermore, Y ∪Z =
⋃
i∈I Yi ∪
⋃
i∈I Zi =
⋃
i∈I(Yi∪Zi) = X ,
and hence M |=X ψ ∨ θ, as required.
4. Suppose that M |=Xi ψ ∧ θ for all i ∈ I. Then for all such i, M |=Xi ψ
and M |=Xi θ; but then, by induction hypothesis, M |=X ψ and M |=X
θ, and therefore M |=X ψ ∧ θ.
5. Suppose that M |=Xi ∃xψ for all i ∈ I, that is, that for all such i there
exists a function Hi : Xi → P(Dom(M))\{∅} such that M |=Xi[Hi/x] ψ.
Then define the function H : X → P(Dom(M))\{∅} so that, for all
s ∈ X , H(s) =
⋃
{Hi(s) : s ∈ Xi}. Now, X [H/x] =
⋃
i∈I(Xi[Hi/x]),
and hence by induction hypothesis M |=X[H/x] ψ, and therefore M |=X
∃xψ.
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6. Suppose that M |=Xi ∀xψ for all i ∈ I, that is, that M |=Xi[M/x] ψ for
all such i. Then, since
⋃
i∈I(Xi[M/x]) =
(⋃
i∈I Xi
)
[M/x] = X [M/x],
by induction hypothesis M |=X[M/x] ψ and therefore M |=X ∀xψ, as
required.
Corollary 4.12. There exist constancy logic formulas which are not equiv-
alent to any inclusion logic formula.
Proof. This follows at once from the fact that the constancy atom =(x) is
not closed under unions.
Indeed, let M be any model with two elements 0 and 1 in its domain, and
consider the two teams X0 = {(x : 0)} and X1 = {(x : 1)}: then M |=X0=(x)
and M |=X1=(x), but M 6|=X0∪X1=(x).
Therefore, not only inclusion logic does not contain dependence logic, it does
not even contain constancy logic!
Now, by Theorem 2.7 we know that dependence logic is properly con-
tained in independence logic. As the following result shows, inclusion logic
is also (properly, because dependence atoms are expressible in independence
logic) contained in independence logic:
Theorem 4.13. Inclusion atoms are expressible in terms of independence
logic formulas. More precisely, an inclusion atom ~t1 ⊆ ~t2 is equivalent to the
independence logic formula
φ := ∀v1v2~z((~z 6= ~t1∧~z 6= ~t2)∨(v1 6= v2∧~z 6= ~t2)∨((v1 = v2∨~z = ~t2)∧~z ⊥ v1v2)).
where v1, v2 and ~z do not occur in ~t1 or ~t2 and where, as in [15], ~z ⊥ v1v2
is a shorthand for ~z ⊥∅ v1v2.
Proof. Suppose thatM |=X ~t1 ⊆ ~t2. Then split the teamX
′ = X [M/v1v2~z]
into three teams Y , Z and W as follows:
• Y = {s ∈ X ′ : s(~z) 6= ~t1〈s〉 and s(~z) 6= ~t2〈s〉};
• Z = {s ∈ X ′ : s(v1) 6= s(v2) and s(~z) 6= ~t2〈s〉};
• W = X ′\(Y ∪Z) = {s ∈ X ′ : s(~z) = ~t2〈s〉 or (s(~z) = ~t1〈s〉 and s(v1) =
s(v2))}.
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Clearly, X ′ = Y ∪Z ∪W , M |=Y z 6= t1 ∧ z 6= t2 and M |=Z v1 6= v2 ∧ z 6= t2;
hence, if we can prove that
M |=W ((v1 = v2 ∨ ~z = ~t2)) ∧ ~z ⊥ v1v2
we can conclude that M |=X φ, as required.
Now, suppose that s ∈ W and s(v1) 6= s(v2): then necessarily s(~z) = ~t2,
since otherwise we would have that s ∈ Z instead. Hence, the first conjunct
v1 = v2 ∨ ~z = ~t2 is satisfied by W .
Now, consider two assignments s and s′ in W : in order to conclude this
direction of the proof, we need to show that there exists a s′′ ∈ W such
that s′′(~z) = s(~z) and s′′(v1v2) = s
′(v1v2). There are two distinct cases to
examine:
1. If s(~z) = ~t2〈s〉, consider the assignment
s′′ = s[s′(v1)/v1][s
′(v2)/v2] :
by construction, s′′ ∈ X ′. Furthermore, since s′′(~z) = ~t2〈s〉 = ~t2〈s
′′〉, s′′
is neither in Y nor in Z. Hence, it is in W , as required.
2. If s(~z) 6= ~t2〈s〉 and s ∈ W , then necessarily s(~z) = ~t1〈s〉 and s(v1) =
s(v2).
Since s ∈ W ⊆ X [M/v1v2~z], there exists an assignment o ∈ X such
that
~t1〈o〉 = ~t1〈s〉 = s(~z);
and since M |=X ~t1 ⊆ ~t2, there also exist an assignment o
′ ∈ X such
that
~t2〈o
′〉 = ~t1〈o〉 = s(~z).
Now consider the assignment s′′ = o′[s′(v1)/v1][s
′(v2)/v2][s(~z)/~z]: by
construction, s′′ ∈ X ′, and since
s′′(~z) = s(~z) = ~t2〈o
′〉 = ~t2〈s
′′〉
we have that s′′ ∈ W , that s′′(~z) = s(~z) and that s′′(v1v2) = s
′(v1v2),
as required.
Conversely, suppose that M |=X φ, let 0 and 1 be two distinct elements
of the domain of M , and let s ∈ X .
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By the definition of φ, the fact that M |=X φ implies that the team
X [M/v1v2~z] can be split into three teams Y , Z and W such that
M |=Y ~z 6= ~t1 ∧ ~z 6= ~t2;
M |=Z v1 6= v2 ∧ ~z 6= ~t2;
M |=W (v1 = v2 ∨ ~z = ~t2) ∧ ~z ⊥ v1v2.
Then consider the assignments
h = s[0/v1][0/v2][~t1〈s〉/~z]
and
h′ = s[0/v1][1/v2][~t2〈s〉/~z]
Clearly, h and h′ are in X [M/v1v2~z]. However, neither of them is in Y , since
h(~z) = ~t1〈h〉 and h
′(~z) = ~t2〈h
′〉, nor in Z, since h(v1) = h(v2) and, again,
since h′(~z) = ~t2〈h
′〉. Hence, both of them are in W .
But we know that M |=W ~z ⊥ v1v2, and thus there exists an assignment
h′′ ∈ W with
h′′(~z) = h(~z) = ~t1〈s〉
and
h′′(v1v2) = h
′(v1v2) = 01.
Now, since h′′(v1) 6= h
′′(v2), since h
′′ ∈ W and since
M |=W v1 = v2 ∨ ~z = ~t2,
it must be the case that h′′(~z) = ~t2〈h
′′〉.
Finally, this h′′ corresponds to some s′′ ∈ X ; and for this s′′,
~t2〈s
′′〉 = ~t2〈h
′′〉 = h′′(~z) = h(~z) = ~t1〈s〉.
This concludes the proof.
The relations between first order (team) logic, constancy logic, depen-
dence logic, inclusion logic and independence logic discovered so far are then
represented by Figure 1.
However, things change if we take in consideration the the expressive
power of these logics with respect to their sentences only. Then, as we saw,
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First Order (Team) Logic
Inclusion
Logic
Dependence
Logic
Constancy
Logic
Independence Logic
⊂
⊃
⊃
⊂
∪
Figure 1: Translatability relations between logics (wrt formulas)
first order logic and constancy logic have the same expressive power, in the
sense that every constancy logic formula is equivalent to some first order
formula and vice versa, and so do dependence and independence logic. What
about inclusion logic sentences?
At the moment, relatively little is known by the author about this. In
essence, all that we know is the following result:
Proposition 4.14. Let ψ(~x, ~y) be any first order formula, where ~x and ~y
are tuples of disjoint variables of the same arity. Furthermore, let ψ′(~x, ~y) be
the result of writing ¬ψ(~x, ~y) in negation normal form. Then, for all suitable
models M and all suitable pairs ~a, ~b of constant terms of the model,
M |={∅} ∃~z(~a ⊆ ~z ∧ ~z 6= ~b ∧ ∀~w(ψ
′(~z, ~w) ∨ ~w ⊆ ~z))
if and only if M |= ¬[TC~x,~y ψ](~a,~b), that is, if and only if the pair of tuples of
elements corresponding to (~a,~b) is not in the transitive closure of {(~m1, ~m2) :
M |= ψ(~m1, ~m2)}.
Proof. Suppose that M |={∅} ∃~z(~a ⊆ ~z ∧ ~z 6= ~b ∧ ∀~w(ψ
′(~z, ~w) ∨ ~w ⊆ ~z)).
Then, by definition, there exists a tuple of functions ~H = H1 . . .Hn such that
1. M |={∅}[ ~H/~z] ~a ⊆ ~z, that is, ~a ∈
~H({∅});
2. M |={∅}[ ~H/~z] ~z 6=
~b, and therefore ~b 6∈ ~H({∅});
3. M |={∅}[ ~H/~z][ ~M/~w] ψ
′(~z, ~w) ∨ ~w ⊆ ~z.
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Now, the third condition implies that whenever M |= ψ(~m1, ~m2) and ~m1 is
in ~H({∅}), ~m2 is in ~H({∅}) too. Indeed, let Y = {∅}[ ~H/~z][ ~M/~w]: then, by
the semantics of our logic, we know that Y = Y1 ∪ Y2 for two subteams Y1
and Y2 such that M |=Y1 ψ
′(~z, ~w) and M |=Y2 ~w ⊆ ~z. But ψ
′ is logically
equivalent to the negation of ψ, and therefore we know that, for all s ∈ Y1,
M 6|= ψ(s(~z), s(~w)) in the usual Tarskian semantics.
Suppose now that ~m1 ∈ ~H({∅}) and that M |= ψ(~m1, ~m2). Then s =
(~z := ~m1, ~w := ~m2) is in Y ; but it cannot be in Y1, as we saw, and hence it
must belong to Y2. But M |=Y2 ~w ⊆ ~z, and therefore there exists another
assignment s′ ∈ Y2 such that s
′(~z) = s(~w) = ~m2. But we necessarily have
that s′(~z) ∈ ~H({∅}), and therefore ~m2 ∈ ~H({∅}), as required.
So, ~H({∅}) is an set of tuples of elements of our models which contains
the interpretation of ~a but not that of ~b and such that
~m1 ∈ H({∅}),M |= ψ(~m1), ~M2 ⇒ ~m2 ∈ H({∅}).
This implies that M |= ¬[TC~x,~y ψ](~a,~b), as required.
Conversely, suppose that M |= ¬[TC~x,~y ψ](~a,~b): then there exists a set A
of tuples of elements of the domain of M which contains the interpretation
of ~a but not that of ~b, and such that it is closed by transitive closure for
ψ(~x, ~y). Then, by choosing the functions ~H so that ~h({∅}) = A, it is easy to
verify that M satisfies our inclusion logic sentence.
As a corollary, we have that inclusion logic is strictly more expressive than
first order logic over sentences: for example, for all finite linear orders M =
(Dom(M), <, S, 0, e), where S is the successor function, 0 is the first element
of the linear order and e is the last one, we have that
M |= ∃z(0 ⊆ z ∧ z 6= e ∧ ∀w(w 6= S(S(z)) ∨ w ⊆ z))
if and only if |M | is odd. It is not difficult to see, for example through the
Ehrenfeucht-Fra¨ısse´ method ([20]), that this property is not expressible in
first order logic.
4.3. Equiextension logic
Let us now consider equiextension logic, that is, the logic obtained by
adding to first order logic (with the lax team semantics) equiextension atoms
~t1 ⊲⊳ ~t2 with the semantics of Definition 4.6.
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It is easy to see that equiextension logic is contained in inclusion logic:
Proposition 4.15. Let ~t1 and ~t2 be any two tuples of terms of the same
length. Then, for all suitable models M and teams X,
M |=X ~t1 ⊲⊳ ~t2 ⇔M |=X ~t1 ⊆ ~t2 ∧ ~t2 ⊆ ~t1.
Proof. Obvious.
Translating in the other direction, however, requires a little more care:
Proposition 4.16. Let ~t1 and ~t2 be any two tuples of terms of the same
length. Then, for all suitable models M and teams X, M |=X ~t1 ⊆ ~t2 if and
only if
M |=X ∀u1u2∃~z(~t2 ⊲⊳ ~z ∧ (u1 6= u2 ∨ ~z = ~t1))
where u1, u2 and ~z do not occur in ~t1 and ~t2.
Proof. Suppose that M |=X ~t1 ⊆ ~t2. Then let X
′ = X [M/u1u2], and pick
the tuple of functions ~H used to choose ~z so that
~H(s) =
{
{~t1〈s〉}, if s(~u1) = s(~u2);
{~t2〈s〉}, otherwise
for all s ∈ X ′.26
Then, for Y = X ′[ ~H/~z], by definition we have that M |=Y u1 6= u2 ∨
~z = ~t1, and it only remains to verify that M |=Y ~t2 ⊲⊳ ~z, that is, that
Y (~t2) = Y (~z).
• Y (~t2) ⊆ Y (~z):
Let h ∈ Y . Then there exists an assignment s ∈ X with ~t2〈s〉 =
~t2〈h〉. Now let 0 and 1 be two distinct elements of M , and consider
the assignment h′ = s[0/u1][1/u2][ ~H/~z]. By construction, h
′ ∈ Y ; and
furthermore, by the definition of ~H we have that h′(~z) = ~t2〈s〉 = ~t2〈h〉,
as required.
26As an aside, it can be observed that, since ~H always selects singletons, this whole
argument can be adapted to the case of strict semantics without any difficulties. Therefore,
strict equiextension logic is equivalent to strict inclusion logic and, by Proposition 4.9, does
not satisfy locality either.
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• Y (~z) ⊆ Y (~t2):
Let h ∈ Y . Then, by construction, h(~z) is ~t1〈h〉 or ~t2〈h〉. But since
X(~t1) ⊆ X(~t2), in either case there exists an assignment s ∈ X such
~t2〈s〉 = h(~z). Now consider h
′ = s[0/u1][1/u2][ ~H/~z]: again, h
′ ∈ Y and
h′(~z) = ~t2〈h
′〉 = ~t2〈s〉 = h(~z), as required.
Conversely, suppose that M |=X ∀u1u2∃~z(~t2 ⊲⊳ ~z ∧ (u1 6= u2 ∨ ~z = ~t1)),
and that therefore there exists a tuple of functions ~H such that, for Y =
X [M/u1u2][ ~H/~z], M |=Y ~t2 ⊲⊳ ~z ∧ (u1 6= u2 ∨ ~z = ~t1). Then consider
any assignment s ∈ X , and let h = s[0/u1][0/u2][ ~H/~z]. Now, h ∈ Y and
h(~z) = ~t1〈s〉; but since M |=Y ~t2 ⊲⊳ ~z, this implies that there exists an
assignment h′ ∈ Y such that ~t2〈h
′〉 = h(~z) = ~t1〈s〉. Finally, h
′ derives
from some assignment s′ ∈ X , and for this assignment we have that ~t2〈s〉 =
~t2〈h
′〉 = ~t1〈s〉 as required.
As a consequence, inclusion logic is precisely as expressive as equiextension
logic:
Corollary 4.17. Any formula of inclusion logic is equivalent to some for-
mula of equiextension logic, and vice versa.
4.4. Exclusion logic
With the name of exclusion logic we refer to (lax, team) first order logic
supplemented with the exclusion atoms ~t1 | ~t2, with the satisfaction condition
given in Definition 4.5.
As the following results show exclusion logic is, in a very strong sense,
equivalent to dependence logic:
Theorem 4.18. For all tuples of terms ~t1 and ~t2, of the same length, there
exists a dependence logic formula φ such that
M |=X φ⇔ M |=X ~t1 | ~t2
for all suitable models M and teams X.
Proof. This follows immediately from Theorem 2.5, since the satisfaction
condition for the exclusion atom is downwards monotone and expressible in
Σ11.
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For the sake of completeness, let us write a direct translation of exclusion
atoms into dependence logic anyway.
Let ~t1 and ~t2 be as in our hypothesis, let ~z be a tuple of new variables, of
the same length of ~t1 and ~t2, and let u1, u2 be two further unused variables.
Then M |=X ~t1 | ~t2 if and only if
M |=X ∀~z∃u1u2(=(~z, u1)∧ =(~z, u2)∧((u1 = u2∧~z 6= ~t1)∨(u1 6= u2∧~z 6= ~t2))).
Indeed, suppose that M |=X ~t1 | ~t2, let X
′ = X [M/~z], and let 0, 1 be two
distinct elements in Dom(M).
Then define the functions H1 and H2 as follows:
• For all s′ ∈ X ′, H1(s
′) = {0};
• For all s′′ ∈ X ′[H1/u1], H2(s
′′) =
{
{0} if s′′(~z) 6∈ X(~t1);
{1} if s′′(~z) ∈ X(~t1).
Then, for Y = X ′[H1H2/u1u2], we have thatM |=Y=(~z, u1) and thatM |=Y=
(~z, u2), since the value of u1 is constant in Y and the value of u2 in Y is
functionally determined by the value of ~z.
Now split Y into the two subteams Y1 and Y2 defined as
Y1 = {s ∈ Y : s(u2) = 0};
Y2 = {s ∈ Y : s(u2) = 1}.
Clearly, M |=Y1 u1 = u2 and M |=Y2 u1 6= u2; hence, we only need to
verify that M |=Y1 ~z 6= ~t1 and that M |=Y2 ~z 6= ~t2.
For the first case, let h be any assignment in Y1: then, by definition,
h(~z) 6= ~t1〈s〉 for all s ∈ X . But then h(~z) 6= ~t1〈h
′〉 for all h′ ∈ Y1, and since
this is true for all h ∈ Y1 we have that M |=Y1 ~z 6= ~t1, as required.
For the second case, let h be in Y2 instead: then, again by definition,
h(~z) = ~t1〈s〉 for some s ∈ X . But M |=X ~t1 | ~t2, and hence h(~z) 6= ~t2〈s
′〉 for
all s′ ∈ X ; and as in the previous case, this implies that h(~z) 6= ~t2(h
′) for
all h′ ∈ Y2 and, since this argument can be made for all h ∈ Y2,M |=Y2 ~z 6= ~t2.
Conversely, suppose that
M |=X ∀~z∃u1u2(=(~z, u1)∧ =(~z, u2)∧((u1 = u2∧~z 6= ~t1)∨(u1 6= u2∧~z 6= ~t2))).
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Then there exist two functionsH1 andH2 such that, for Y = X [M/~z][H1H2/u1u2],
M |=Y=(~z, u1)∧ =(~z, u2) ∧ ((u1 = u2 ∧ ~z 6= ~t1) ∨ (u1 6= u2 ∧ ~z 6= ~t2)).
Now, let s1 and s2 be any two assignments in X : in order to conclude the
proof, I only need to show that ~t1〈s1〉 6= ~t2〈s2〉. Suppose instead that ~t1〈s1〉 =
~t2〈s2〉 = ~m for some tuple of elements ~m, and consider two assignments h1, h2
such that
h1 ∈ {s1[~m/~z]}[H1H2/u1u2];
27
and
h2 ∈ {s2[~m/~z]}[H1H2/u1u2].
Then h1, h2 ∈ Y ; and furthermore, since h1(~z) = h2(~z) and M |==(~z, u1)∧ =
(~z, u2), it must hold that h1(~u1) = h2(~u1) and h1(~u2) = h2(~u2).
Moreover, M |=Y (u1 = u2 ∧ ~z 6= ~t1) ∨ (u1 6= u2 ∧ ~z 6= ~t2), and therefore
Y can be split into two subteams Y1 and Y2 such that
M |=Y1 (u1 = u2 ∧ ~z 6= ~t1)
and
M |=Y2 (u1 6= u2 ∧ ~z 6= ~t2).
Now, as we saw, the assignments h1 and h2 coincide over u1 and u2, and
hence either {h1, h2} ⊆ Y1 or {h1, h2} ⊆ Y2. But neither case is possible,
because
h1(~z) = ~m = ~t1〈s1〉 = ~t1〈h1〉
and therefore h1 cannot be in Y1, and because
h2(~z) = ~m = ~t2〈s2〉 = ~t2〈h2〉
and therefore h2 cannot be in Y2.
So we reached a contradiction, and this concludes the proof.
27This team and the next one are actually singletons, because H1 and H2 must satisfy
the dependency conditions.
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Theorem 4.19. Let t1 . . . tn be terms, and let z be a variable not occurring
in any of them. Then the dependence atom =(t1 . . . tn) is equivalent to the
exclusion logic expression
φ = ∀z(z = tn ∨ (t1 . . . tn−1z | t1 . . . tn−1tn)),
for all suitable models M and teams X.
Proof. Suppose that M |=X=(t1 . . . tn), and consider the team X [M/z].
Now, let Y = {s ∈ X [M/z] : s(z) = tn〈s〉} and let Z = X [M/z]\Y .
Clearly, Y ∪ Z = X [M/x] and M |=Y z = tn; hence, if we show that
Z |= t1 . . . tn−1z | t1 . . . tn−1tn we can conclude that M |=X φ, as required.
Now, consider any two s, s′ ∈ Z, and suppose that ti〈s〉 = ti〈s
′〉 for all
i = 1 . . . n − 1. But then s(z) 6= tn〈s
′〉: indeed, since M |=X=(t1 . . . tn), by
the locality of dependence logic and by the downwards closure property we
have that M |=Z=(t1 . . . tn) and hence that tn〈s〉 = tn〈s
′〉.
Therefore, if we had that s(z) = tn〈s
′〉, it would follow that s(z) =
tn〈s
′〉 = tn〈s〉 and s would be in Y instead.
So s(z) 6= tn〈s
′〉, and since this holds for all s and s′ in Z which coincide
over t1 . . . tn−1 we have that
M |=Z t1 . . . tn−1z | t1 . . . tn−1tn,
as required.
Conversely, suppose that M |=X φ, and let s, s
′ ∈ X assign the same
values to t1 . . . tn−1. Now, by the definition of φ, X [M/z] can be split into
two subteams Y and Z such that M |=Y z = tn and
M |=Z (t1 . . . tn−1z | t1 . . . tn−1tn).
Now, suppose that tn〈s〉 = m and tn〈s
′〉 = m′, and that m 6= m′: then
s[m′/z] and s′[m/z] are in s[M/z] but not in Y , and hence they are both in
Z. But then, since ~ti〈s〉 = ~ti〈s
′〉 for all i = 1 . . . n− 1,
tn〈s
′〉 = m′ = s[m′/z](z) 6= tn〈s
′[m/z]〉 = tn〈s
′〉
which is a contradiction. Therefore, m = m′, as required.
Corollary 4.20. Dependence logic is precisely as expressive as exclusion
logic, both with respect to definability of sets of teams and with respect to
sentences.
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4.5. Inclusion/exclusion logic
Now that we have some information about inclusion logic and about ex-
clusion logic, let us study inclusion/exclusion logic (I/E logic for short), that
is, the formalism obtained by adding both inclusion and exclusion atoms to
the language of first-order logic.
By the results of the previous sections, we already know that inclusion
atoms are expressible in independence logic and that exclusion atoms are
expressible in dependence logic; furthermore, by Theorem 2.7, dependence
atoms are expressible in independence logic.
Then it follows at once that I/E logic is contained in independence logic:
Corollary 4.21. For every inclusion/exclusion logic formula φ there exists
an independence logic formula φ∗ such that
M |=X φ⇔M |=X φ
∗
for all suitable models M and teams X.
Now, is I/E logic properly contained in independence logic?
As the following result illustrates, this is not the case:
Theorem 4.22. Let ~t2 ⊥~t1
~t3 be an independence atom, and let φ be the
formula
∀~p~q~r ∃u1u2u3u4
(
4∧
i=1
=(~p~q~r, ui) ∧ ((u1 6= u2 ∧ (~p~q | ~t1~t2))∨
∨(u1 = u2 ∧ u3 6= u4 ∧ (~p~r | ~t1~t3)) ∨ (u1 = u2 ∧ u3 = u4 ∧ (~p~q~r ⊆ ~t1~t2~t3)))
)
where the dependence atoms are used as shorthands for the corresponding
exclusion logic expressions, which exist because of Theorem 4.19, and where
all the quantified variables are new.
Then, for all suitable models M and teams X,
M |=X ~t2 ⊥~t1
~t3 ⇔M |=X φ.
Proof. Suppose thatM |=X ~t2 ⊥~t1
~t3, and consider the teamX
′ = X [M/~p~q~r].
Now, let 0 and 1 be two distinct elements of the domain of M , and let
the functions F1 . . . F4 be defined as follows:
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• For all s ∈ X ′, F1(s) = 0;
• For all s ∈ X ′[F1/u1],
F2(s) =
{
0 if there exists a s′ ∈ X such that ~t1〈s
′〉~t2〈s
′〉 = s(~p)s(~q);
1 otherwise;
• For all s ∈ X ′[F1/u1][F2/u2], F3(s) = 0;
• For all s ∈ X ′[F1/u1][F2/u2][F3/u3],
F4(s) =
{
0 if there exists a s′ ∈ X such that ~t1〈s
′〉~t3〈s
′〉 = s(~p)s(~r);
1 otherwise.
Now, let Y = X ′[F1/u1][F2/u2][F3/u3][F4/u4]: by the definitions of F1 . . . F4,
it holds that all dependencies are respected. Let then Y be split into Y1, Y2
and Y3 according to:
• Y1 = {s ∈ Y : s(u1) 6= s(u2)};
• Y2 = {s ∈ Y : s(u3) 6= s(u4)}\Y1;
• Y3 = Y \(Y1 ∪ Y2).
Now, let s be any assignment of Y1: then, since s(u1) 6= s(u2), by the
definitions of F1 and F2 we have that
∀s′ ∈ Y, s(~p)s(~q) 6= ~t1〈s
′〉~t2〈s
′〉
and, in particular, that the same holds for all the s′ ∈ Y1. Hence,
M |=Y1 u1 6= u2 ∧ (~p~q | ~t1~t2),
as required.
Analogously, let s be any assignment of Y2: then s(u1) = s(u2), since
otherwise s would be in Y1, s(u3) 6= s(u4) and
∀s′ ∈ Y, s(~p)s(~r) 6= ~t1〈s
′〉~t3〈s
′〉
and therefore
M |=Y2 u1 = u2 ∧ u3 6= u4 ∧ (~p~r | ~t1~t3).
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Finally, suppose that s ∈ Y3: then, by definition, s(u1) = s(u2) and s(u3) =
s(u4). Therefore, there exist two assignments s
′ and s′′ in X such that
~t1〈s
′〉~t2〈s
′〉 = s(~p)s(~q)
and
~t1〈s
′′〉~t3〈s
′′〉 = s(~p)s(~r)
But by hypothesis we know that M |=X ~t2 ⊥~t1
~t3, and s
′ and s′′ coincide over
~t1, and therefore there exists a new assignment h ∈ X such that
~t1〈h〉~t2〈h〉~t3〈h〉 = s(~p)s(~q)s(~r).
Now, let o be the assignment of Y given by
o = h[~t1〈h〉~t2〈h〉~t3〈h〉/~p~q~r][F1 . . . F4/u1 . . . u4] :
by the definitions of F1 . . . F4 and by the construction of o, we then get that
o(u1) = o(u2) = o(u3) = o(u4) = 0
and therefore that o ∈ Y3.
But by construction,
~t1〈o〉~t2〈o〉~t3〈o〉 = ~t1〈h〉~t2〈h〉~t3〈h〉 = s(~p)s(~q)s(~r),
and hence
M |=Y3 ~p~q~r ⊆ ~t1~t2~t3
as required.
Conversely, suppose that M |=X φ, and let s, s
′ ∈ X be such that ~t1〈s〉 =
~t1〈s
′〉. Now, consider the two assignments h, h′ ∈ X ′ = X [M/~p~q~r] given by
h = s[~t1〈s〉/~p][~t2〈s〉/~q][~t3〈s
′〉/~r]
and
h′ = s′[~t1〈s〉/~p][~t2〈s〉/~q][~t3〈s
′〉/~r].
Now, since M |=X φ, there exist functions F1 . . . F4, depending only on ~p,
~q and ~r, such that
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Y = X ′[F1/u1][F2/u2][F3/u3][F4/u4] can be split into three subteams Y1, Y2
and Y3 and
M |=Y1 (u1 6= u2 ∧ (~p~q | ~t1~t2));
M |=Y2 (u1 = u2 ∧ u3 6= u4 ∧ (~p~r | ~t1~t3));
M |=Y3 (u1 = u2 ∧ u3 = u4 ∧ (~p~q~r ⊆ ~t1~t2~t3)).
Now, let
o = h[F1/u1][F2/u2][F3/u3][F4/u4]
and
o′ = h′[F1/u1][F2/u2][F3/u3][F4/u4] :
since the Fi depend only on ~p~q~r and the values of these variables are the same
for h and for h′, we have that o and o′ have the same values for u1 . . . u4, and
therefore that they belong to the same Yi.
But they cannot be in Y1 nor in Y2, since
o(~p)o(~q) = o′(~p)o′(~q) = ~t1〈s〉~t2〈s〉 = ~t1〈o〉~t2〈o〉
and
o(~p)o(~r) = o′(~p)o′(~r) = ~t1〈s
′〉~t3〈s
′〉 = ~t1〈o
′〉~t3〈o
′〉;
therefore, o and o′ are in Y3, and there exists an assignment o
′′ ∈ Y3 with
~t1〈o
′′〉~t2〈o
′′〉~t3〈o
′′〉 = o(~p)o(~q)o(~r) = ~t1〈s〉~t2〈s〉~t3〈s
′〉
and, finally, there exists a s′′ ∈ X such that ~t1〈s
′′〉~t2〈s
′′〉~t3〈s
′′〉 = ~t1〈s〉~t2〈s〉~t3〈s
′〉,
as required.
Independence logic and inclusion/exclusion logic are therefore equivalent:
Corollary 4.23. Any independence logic formula is equivalent to some in-
clusion/exclusion logic formula, and any inclusion/exclusion logic formula is
equivalent to some independence logic formula.
Figure 2 summarizes the translatability28 relations between the logics of
imperfect information which have been considered in this work.
28To be more accurate, Figure 2 represents the translatability relations between the
logics which we considered, with respect to all formulas. Considering sentences only would
lead to a different graph.
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Figure 2: Relations between logics of imperfect information (wrt formulas)
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Let us finish this section verifying that I/E logic (and, as a consequence,
also inclusion logic, equiextension logic and independence logic) with the lax
semantics is local:
Theorem 4.24 (Inclusion/exclusion logic with lax semantics is local).
Let M be a first order model, let φ be any I/E logic formula and let V be a
set of variables such that Free(φ) ⊆ V . Then, for all suitable teams X,
M |=X φ⇔M |=X↾V φ
Proof. The proof is by structural induction on φ.
1. If φ is a first order literal, an inclusion atom or an exclusion atom then
the statement follows trivially from the corresponding semantic rule;
2. Let φ be of the form ψ ∨ θ, and suppose that M |=X ψ ∨ θ. Then, by
definition, X = Y ∪Z for two subteams Y and Z such thatM |=Y ψ and
M |=Z θ. Then, by induction hypothesis, M |=Y↾V ψ and M |=Z↾V θ.
But X↾V = Y↾V ∪ Z↾V : indeed, s ∈ X if and only if s ∈ Y or s ∈ Z,
and hence s↾V ∈ X↾V if and only if it is in Y↾V or in Z↾V . Hence,
M |=X↾V ψ ∨ θ, as required.
Conversely, suppose that M |=X↾V ψ ∨ θ, that is, that X↾V = Y
′ ∪ Z ′
for two subteams Y ′ and Z ′ such that M |=Y ′ ψ and M |=Z′ θ. Then
define Y = {s ∈ X : s↾V ∈ Y
′} and Z = {s ∈ X : s↾V ∈ Z
′}. Now,
X = Y ∪ Z: indeed, if s ∈ X then s↾V is in X↾V , and hence it is in
Y ′ or in Z ′, and on the other hand if s is in Y or in Z then it is in X
by definition. Furthermore, Y↾V = Y
′ and Z↾V = Z
′,29 and hence by
induction hypothesis M |=Y ψ and M |=Z θ, and finally M |=X ψ ∨ θ.
3. Let φ be of the form ψ ∧ θ. Then M |=X ψ ∧ θ if and only if M |=X ψ
andM |=X θ, that is, by induction hypothesis, if and only ifM |=X↾V ψ
and M |=X↾V θ. But this is the case if and only if M |=X↾V ψ ∧ θ, as
required.
4. Let φ be of the form ∃xψ, and suppose that M |=X ∃xψ. Then there
exists a function H : X → P(Dom(M))\{∅} such that M |=X[H/x] ψ.
Then, by induction hypothesis, M |=(X[H/x])↾V ∪{x} ψ.
29By definition, Y↾V ⊆ Y ′ and Z↾V ⊆ Z ′. On the other hand, if s′ ∈ Y ′ then s′ ∈ X↾V ,
and hence s′ is of the form s↾V for some s ∈ X , and therefore this s is in Y too, and finally
s′ = s↾V ∈ Y↾V . The same argument shows that Z ′ ⊆ Z↾V .
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Now consider the function H ′ : X↾V → P(Dom(M))\∅ which assigns
to every s′ ∈ X↾V the set
H ′(s′) =
⋃
{H(s) : s ∈ X, s′ = s↾V }.
Then H ′ assigns a nonempty set to every s′ ∈ X↾V , as required; and fur-
thermore, X↾V [H
′/x] is precisely (X [H/x])↾V ∪{x}.
30 Therefore,M |=X↾V
∃xψ, as required.
Conversely, suppose thatM |=X↾V ∃xψ, that is, thatM |=X↾V [H′/x] ψ for
some H ′. Then define the function H : X → P(Dom(M))\{x} so that
H(s) = H ′(s↾V ) for all s ∈ X ; now, X↾V [H
′/x] = (X [H/x])↾V ∪{x},
31
and hence by induction hypothesis M |=X ∃xψ.
5. For all suitable teams X , X [M/x]↾V ∪{x} = X↾V [M/x]; and hence,
M |=X↾V ∀xψ ⇔ M |=X[M/x]↾V∪{x} ψ ⇔ M |=X[M/x] ψ ⇔ M |=X ∀xψ,
as required.
5. Game theoretic semantics
By this point, we have developed a team semantics for inclusion/exclusion
logic and we have examined the relations between it and other logics of im-
perfect information. In this section, an equivalent game theoretic semantics
for inclusion/exclusion logic will be developed; once this is done, the seman-
tics for inclusion logic and for exclusion logic will simply be the restrictions
of this semantics to the corresponding sublanguages. The connection be-
tween game semantics and team semantics, moreover, will allow us to revisit
and further justify the distinction between lax and strict connectives intro-
duced in Section 3.1. However, we will not discuss here the history or the
motivations of game theoretic semantics, nor its connections to other game-
theoretical approaches to formal semantics. The interested reader is referred
30Indeed, suppose that s′ ∈ X [H/x]: then there exists a s ∈ X such that s′ = s[m/x]
for some m ∈ H(s). Then s↾V ∈ X↾V , and moreover m ∈ H ′(s↾V ) by the definition of H ′,
and hence s′
↾V ∪{x} = s↾V [m/x] ∈ X↾V [H
′/x].
Conversely, suppose that h′ ∈ X↾V [H ′/x]: then there exists a h ∈ X↾V such that
h′ = h[m/x] for some m ∈ H ′(h). But then there exists a s ∈ X such that h = s↾V
and such that m ∈ H(s); and therefore, s[m/x] ∈ X [H/x], and finally h′ = h[m/x] =
(s[m/x])↾V ∪{x} ∈ (X [H/x])↾V ∪{x}.
31In brief, for all s ∈ X and all m ∈ Dom(M) we have that m ∈ H ′(s↾V ) if and only if
m ∈ H(s), by definition. Hence, for all such s and m, s↾V [m/x] ∈ X↾V [H ′/x] if and only
if s[m/x] ∈ X [H/x].
47
to [18] and [19] for a more philosophically oriented discussion of game theo-
retic semantics; in the rest of this section, we will content ourselves to present
such a semantics for the case of I/E logic and prove its equivalence to team
semantics.
Definition 5.1 (Semantic games for I/E logic). Let φ be an I/E logic
formula, let M be a first order model over a signature containing that of φ
and let X be a team over M whose domain contains all free variables of φ.
Then the game GMX (φ) is defined as follows:
• There are two players, called I and II;32
• The positions of the game are expressions of the form (ψ, s), where ψ is
an instance of a subformula of φ and s is an assignment whose domain
contains all free variables of ψ;
• The initial positions are all those of the form (φ, s) for s ∈ X ;
• The terminal positions are those of the form (α, s), where α is a first
order literal, an inclusion atom, or an exclusion atom;
• If p = (ψ, s) is not a terminal position, the set S(p) of its successors is
defined according to the following rules:
1. If ψ is of the form θ1 ∨ θ2 or θ1 ∧ θ2 then S(p) = {(θ1, s), (θ2, s)};
2. If ψ is of the form ∃xθ or ∀xθ then S(p) = {(θ, s[m/x]) : m ∈
Dom(M)};
• If p = (ψ, s) is not a terminal position, the active player T (p) ∈ {I, II}
is defined according to the following rules:
1. If ψ is of the form θ1 ∨ θ2 or ∃xθ then T (p) = II;
2. If ψ is of the form θ1 ∧ θ2 or ∀xθ then T (p) = I;
• A terminal position p = (α, s) is winning for Player II if and only if
– α is a first order literal and M |=s α in the usual first order sense,
or
– α is an inclusion atom ~t1 ⊆ ~t2 and s is any assignment, or
32These players can also be named Falsifier and Verifier, or Abelard and Eloise.
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– α is an exclusion atom ~t1 | ~t2 and s is any assignment.
If a terminal position is not winning for Player II, it is winning for
Player I.
The definitions of play, complete play and winning play are straightforward:
Definition 5.2. Let GMX (φ) be a semantic game as above. Then a play for
GMX (φ) is a finite sequence of positions p1 . . . pn such that
• p1 is an initial position;
• For all i = 2 . . . n, pi ∈ S(pi−1).
Such a play is said to be complete if, furthermore, pn is a terminal position;
and it is winning for Player II [I] if and only if pn is a winning position for
II [I].
However, it will be useful to consider non-deterministic strategies rather
than deterministic ones only:
Definition 5.3. Let GMX (φ) be a semantic game as above. Then a strategy
for Player II [I] in GMX (φ) is a function τ sending each position p = (ψ, s)
with T (p) = II [I] into some τ(p) ∈ P(S(p))\∅.
Such a strategy is said to be deterministic if, for all such p, τ(p) is a
singleton.
A play p1 . . . pn is said to follow a strategy τ for II [I] if and only if, for
all i ∈ 1 . . . n− 1,
T (pi) = II [I]⇒ pi+1 ∈ τ(pi).
A strategy τ for II [I] is winning for Player II [I] if and only if all com-
plete plays ~p which follow τ are winning for II [I].
The set of all plays of GMX (φ) in which Player ρ ∈ {I, II} follows strategy
τ will be written as P (GMX (φ), ρ : τ).
So far, inclusion and exclusion atoms play little role in our semantics, as
they always correspond to winning positions for Player II. Similarly to
dependence atoms in [32], however, inclusion and exclusion atoms restrict
the set of strategies available to Player II. This is modeled by the following
definition of uniform strategy :
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Definition 5.4. Let GMX (φ) be a semantic game as above. Then a strategy
τ for Player II is said to be uniform if and only if, for all complete plays
p1 . . . pn = ~p ∈ P (G
M
X (φ), II : τ),
1. If pn is of the form pn = (~t1 ⊆ ~t2, s) then there exists a play q1 . . . qn′ ∈
P (GMX (φ), II : τ) such that qn′ = (~t1 ⊆ ~t2, s
′) for the same instance of
the inclusion atom and such that ~t2〈s
′〉 = ~t1〈s〉;
2. If pn is of the form pn = (~t1 | ~t2, s) then for all plays q1 . . . qn′ ∈
P (GMX (φ), II : τ) such that qn′ = (~t1 | ~t2, s
′) for the same instance
of the exclusion atom it holds that ~t1〈s〉 6= ~t2〈s
′〉.
This notion of uniformity also makes it clear why in inclusion logic there is
a difference between working with non-deterministic and with deterministic
strategies: whereas the uniformity condition for dependence atoms restrict
the information available to Player II thorough the game, the one for inclu-
sion atoms requires that the set of possible plays, given a strategy for Player
II, is closed with respect to certain monotonically increasing operators. This
phenomenon does not occur for the uniformity conditions of exclusion atoms,
whose form is more similar to the conditions of the dependence atom in [32].
The next definition and the lemmas following it will be of some use in order
to prove the main result of this section:
Definition 5.5. Let GMX (φ) be a game as in our previous definitions and let
τ be a strategy for Player II in it. Furthermore, let ψ be an instance of a
subformula of φ and let
Y = {s : there is a play in P (GMX , II : τ) passing through (ψ, s)}.
Furthermore, let τ ′ be the restriction of τ to GMY (ψ), in the sense that
τ ′(θ, s) = τ(θ, s) for all θ contained in ψ and for all assignments s. Then
we say that (Y, ψ, τ ′) is a M-successor of (X, φ, τ), and we write
(Y, ψ, τ ′) ≤M (X, φ, τ).
From a game-theoretical perspective, the notion of M-successor can be seen
as a generalization of the notion of the concepts of subgame and substrategy
to multiple initial positions and to games of imperfect information.
Lemma 5.6. Let GMX (φ) be a semantic game for I/E logic, and let ψ be an
instance of a subformula in φ. Then there exists precisely one team Y and
precisely one strategy τ ′ for GMY (ψ) such that (Y, ψ, τ
′) ≤M (X, φ, τ).
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Proof. Obvious from definition.
Lemma 5.7. Let GMX (φ) be a semantic game as usual, and let τ be a strategy
for Player II in it. Furthermore, let ψ be an instance of a subformula of φ
and let Y , τ ′ be such that (Y, ψ, τ ′) ≤M (X, φ, τ). Then
1. For any play p1 . . . pn = ~p ∈ P (G
M
X (φ), II : τ) passing through the
subformula ψ there exist a k ∈ 1 . . . n such that pk . . . pn is a play in
P (GMY (ψ), II : τ
′);
2. For any play q1 . . . qm = ~q ∈ P (G
M
Y (ψ), II : τ
′) there exists a k ∈ 1 . . . n
and positions p1 . . . pk of the game G
M
X (φ) such that p1 . . . pkq1 . . . qm is
a play in (GMX (ψ), II : τ).
Proof. 1. Consider any play p1 . . . pn as in our hypothesis, and let k ∈
1 . . . n be such that pk = (ψ, s) for some assignment s. Then, by def-
inition of M-successors, s ∈ Y and pk is a possible initial position of
GMY (ψ); furthermore, again by the definition of M-successor, we have
that, for all i = k . . . n− 1, τ ′(pi) = τ(pi) ∋ pi+1.
Hence, pk . . . pn is a play in P (G
M
Y (ψ), II : τ
′), as required.
2. Consider any play q1 . . . qm as in our hypothesis, and hence let q1 =
(ψ, s) for some s ∈ Y . Then, by definition, there exists a play p1 . . . pn in
P (GMX (ψ), II : τ) such that pk+1 = q1 = (ψ, s) for some k ∈ 0 . . . n− 1.
But τ ′ behaves like τ , and hence τ(qi) = τ
′(qi) ∋ qi+1 for all i =
1 . . .m − 1. Thus, p1 . . . pkq1 . . . qm is a play in (G
M
X (ψ), II : τ), as
required.
Lemma 5.8. Let GMX (φ) be a semantic game as usual, and let τ be a strategy
for Player II in it. Furthermore, let ψ be an instance of a subformula of φ
and let Y , τ ′ be such that (Y, ψ, τ ′) ≤M (X, φ, τ).
Then
1. If τ is winning for II in GMX (φ) then τ
′ is winning for II in GMY (ψ);
2. If τ is uniform in GMX (φ) then τ
′ is uniform in GMY (ψ);
3. If τ is deterministic in GMX (φ) then τ
′ is deterministic in GMY (ψ).
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Proof. 1. Suppose that τ is winning33, and consider any play q1 . . . qm =
~q ∈ P (GMY (ψ), II : τ
′). Then, by Lemma 5.7, there exists a play
p1 . . . pn ∈ P (G
M
X (φ), II : τ) such that pk . . . pn = q1 . . . qm for some
k ∈ 1 . . .m. But τ is a winning strategy for II in GMX (φ) and therefore
pn is a winning position, as required.
2. Suppose that τ is uniform, and consider any play q1 . . . qm = ~q ∈
P (GMY (ψ), II : τ
′).
Then, again, there exists a play p1 . . . pn = ~p ∈ P (G
M
X (ψ), II : τ) such
that pk . . . pn = q1 . . . qm for some k.
Now suppose that pn = qm = (~t1 ⊆ ~t2, s): then, since τ is a uniform
strategy, there exists another play p′1 . . . p
′
n′ in (G
M
X (φ), II : τ) such that
p′n′ = (~t1 ⊆ ~t2, s
′) for the same instance of the inclusion atom and for a
s′ such that t2〈s
′〉 = t1〈s〉.
Since pn and p
′
n′ correspond the same dependency atom of ~p, it must
be the case that the play p′1 . . . p
′
n′ passes through ψ; and therefore, by
Lemma 5.7, there exists some j ∈ 1 . . . n′ such that p′j . . . p
′
n′ is a play
in P (GMY (ψ), τ
′), thus satisfying the uniformity condition for τ ′.
Now suppose that pn = qm = (~t1 | ~t2, s) instead, and consider any other
play q′1 . . . q
′
m′ ∈ P (G
M
Y (ψ), τ
′) such that q′m = (~t1 | ~t2, s
′) for the same
instance of the exclusion atom. Then there exist positions p′1 . . . p
′
k′
such that p′1 . . . p
′
k′q
′
1 . . . q
′
m′ is a play in P (G
M
X (φ), II : τ). But τ is
uniform, and therefore s(~t1) 6= s
′(~t2), as required.
3. This follows trivially by the definition of M-successor.
Lemma 5.9. Let GMX (φ) be a semantic game for I/E logic and let τ be a
strategy for II in it. Furthermore, let ψ1 . . . ψt be an enumeration of all im-
mediate subformulas of φ, and let Y1 . . . Yt, τ1 . . . τt be such that (Yi, ψi, τi) ≤M
(X, φ, τ) for all i ∈ 1 . . . t. Then
1. If all τi are winning in G
M
Yi
(ψi) then τ is winning in G
M
X (φ);
2. If all τi are uniform in G
M
Yi
(ψi) then τ is uniform in G
M
X (φ);
33Here and in the rest of the work, when we write “winning” without specifying the
player we mean “winning for Player II”.
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3. If all τi are deterministic in G
M
Yi
(ψi) and T (φ) = I
34 then τ is deter-
ministic;
4. If all τi are deterministic in G
M
Yi
(ψi), T (φ) = II and |τ(φ, s)| = 1 for
all s ∈ Y then τ is deterministic.
Proof. 1. Suppose that all τi are winning for the respective games, and
consider any play p1 . . . pn = ~p ∈ P (G
M
X (φ), II : τ). Then p2 is of
the form (ψi, s) for some i ∈ 1 . . . t and some s ∈ Yi; and therefore,
p2 . . . pn ∈ P (G
M
Yi
(ψ), II : τi). But τi is winning, and hence pn is a
winning position for Player II, as required.
2. Suppose that all τi are uniform, and consider any play p1 . . . pn = ~p ∈
P (GMX (φ), II : τ): then, once again, p2 . . . pn ∈ P (G
M
Yi
(ψi), II : τi) for
some i.
Suppose now that pn is (~t1 ⊆ ~t2, s): since τi is uniform, there exists
another play q1 . . . qm = ~q ∈ P (G
M
Yi
(ψi), II : τi) such that qm = (~t1 ⊆
~t2, s
′) for the same instance of the inclusion atom and
~t1〈s〉 = ~t2〈s
′〉.
Finally, ~q is contained in a play of (GMX (φ), II : τ) and hence the uni-
formity condition is respected for τ .
Suppose instead that pn is (~t1 | ~t2, s), and consider any other play
p′1 . . . p
′
n′ of P (G
M
X (φ), II : τ) such that p
′
n′ is (~t1 | ~t2, s
′) for the same
instance of ~t1 | ~t2. Now, since the same exclusion atom is reached, it
must be the case that p′2 . . . p
′
n′ is in P (G
M
Y (ψi), II : τi) too, for the
same i; but then, since τi is uniform, ~t1〈s〉 6= ~t2〈s
′〉, as required.
3. Let p be any position in GMX (φ) such that T (p) = II. Then p corre-
sponds to a subformula of some ψi, and hence |τ(p)| = |τi(p)| = 1.
4. Let p be any position in GMX (φ) such that T (p) = I. If p is (φ, s)
for some s ∈ Y , then |τ(p)| = 1 by hypothesis; and otherwise, p
corresponds to a subformula of some ψi, and as in the previous case
|τ(p)| = |τi(p)| = 1.
34With a slight abuse of notation, we say that T (ψ) = α if T (ψ, s) = α for all suitable
assignments s. In other words, T (ψ) = I if ψ is of the form ψ1 ∧ ψ2 or of the form ∀vψ1,
and T (ψ) = II if ψ is of the form ψ1 ∨ ψ2 or ∃vψ1.
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Finally, the connection between semantic games and team semantics is
given by the following theorem:
Theorem 5.10. Let M be a first order model, let φ be an inclusion logic
formula over the signature of M and let X be a team over M whose do-
main contains all free variables of φ. Then Player II has a uniform winning
strategy in GMX (φ) if and only if M |=X φ (with respect to the lax semantics).
Proof. The proof is by structural induction on φ.
1. If φ is a first order literal then the only strategy available to II in
GMX (φ) is the empty one. This strategy is always uniform, and the
plays which follow it are of the form ~p = p1 = (φ, s), where s ranges
over X . Such a play is winning for II if and only if M |=s φ in the
usual first-order sense; and hence, the strategy is winning for II if and
only if M |=s φ for all s ∈ X , that is, if and only if M |=X φ.
2. If φ is an inclusion atom ~t1 ⊆ ~t2 then, again, the only strategy available
to Player II is the empty one and the plays which follow it are those
of the form ~p = p1 = (~t1 ⊆ ~t2, s) for some s ∈ X .
By the definition of the winning positions of GMX (φ), this strategy is
winning; hence, it only remains to check whether it is uniform.
Now, in order for the strategy to be uniform it must be the case that
for all plays ~p = p1 = (~t1 ⊆ ~t2, s) where s ∈ X there exists a play
~q = q1 = (~t1 ⊆ ~t2, s
′), again for s′ ∈ X , such that ~t2〈s
′〉 = ~t1〈s〉. But
this can be the case if and only if ∀s ∈ X∃s′ ∈ X s.t. ~t1〈s〉 = ~t2〈s
′〉,
that is, if and only if M |=X ~t1 ⊆ ~t2.
3. If φ is an exclusion atom ~t1 | ~t2, the only strategy for II in G
M
X (φ)
is, once again, the empty one. This strategy is always winning, and
it is uniform if and only if for all plays ~p = p1 = (~t1 | ~t2, s) and
~q = q1 = (~t1 | ~t2, s
′) (for s, s′ ∈ X) it holds that ~t1〈s〉 6= ~t2〈s
′〉.
But this is the case if and only if M |=X ~t1 | ~t2, as required.
4. If φ is a disjunction ψ∨θ, suppose that τ is a uniform winning strategy
for II in GMX (ψ ∨ θ). Then define the teams Y, Z ⊆ X as follows:
Y = {s ∈ X : (ψ, s) ∈ τ(ψ ∨ θ, s)};
Z = {s ∈ X : (θ, s) ∈ τ(ψ ∨ θ, s)}.
Then Y ∪ Z = X : indeed, for all s ∈ X it must be the case that
∅ 6= τ(ψ ∨ θ, s) ( {(ψ, s), (θ, s)}. Furthermore, Y ∩ Z = ∅.
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Now consider the following two strategies for II in GMY (ψ) and G
M
Z (θ)
respectively:
• τ1(p) = τ(p) for all positions p of G
M
Y (ψ);
• τ2(p) = τ(p) for all positions p of G
M
Z (θ).
Since all positions of GMY (ψ) and of G
M
Z (θ) are also positions of G
M
X (ψ∨
θ), τ1 and τ2 are well-defined.
Furthermore, (Y, ψ, τ1) ≤M (X, φ, τ) and (Z, ψ, τ2) ≤M (X, φ, τ); there-
fore, by Lemma 5.8, τ1 and τ2 are uniform and winning for G
M
Y (ψ)
and GMZ (θ). By induction hypothesis, this implies that M |=Y ψ and
M |=Z θ, and by the definition of the semantics for disjunction, this
implies that M |=X ψ ∨ θ.
Conversely, suppose that M |=X ψ ∨ θ: then, by definition, there exist
teams Y and Z such that X = Y ∪ Z, M |=Y ψ and M |=Z θ. Then,
by induction hypothesis, there exist uniform winning strategies τ1 and
τ2 for II in G
M
Y (ψ) and G
M
Z (θ) respectively. Then define the strategy
τ for II in GMX (ψ ∨ θ) as follows:
• τ(ψ ∨ θ, s) =


{(ψ, s)} if s ∈ Y \Z;
{(θ, s)} if s ∈ Z\Y ;
{(ψ, s), (θ, s)} if s ∈ Y ∩ Z;
• If p is (χ, s) for some s and some formula χ contained in ψ, then
τ(p) = τ1(p);
• If p is (χ, s) for some s and some χ contained in θ, then τ(p) =
τ2(p).
Then, by construction, we have that (Y, ψ, τ1), (Z, θ, τ2) ≤M (X,ψ ∨
θ, τ); furthermore, ψ and θ are all the immediate subformulas of ψ ∨ θ,
and τ1 and τ2 are winning and uniform by hypothesis. Therefore, by
Lemma 5.9, τ is a uniform winning strategy for GMX (ψ∨θ), as required.
5. If φ is ψ ∧ θ, suppose again that τ is a uniform winning strategy for II
in GMX (ψ ∧ θ). Then consider the two strategies for II in G
M
X (ψ) and
GMZ (θ), respectively, defined as
• τ1(p) = τ(p) for all positions p of G
M
X (ψ);
• τ2(p) = τ(p) for all positions p of G
M
X (θ).
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Then (X,ψ, τ1), (X, θ, τ2) ≤M (X,ψ ∧ θ, τ), and therefore by Lemma
5.8 ψ and θ are uniform winning strategies. Hence, by induction hy-
pothesis, M |=X ψ and M |=X θ, and therefore M |=X ψ ∧ θ.
Conversely, suppose that M |=X ψ ∧ θ. Then M |=X ψ and M |=X θ,
and therefore II has uniform winning strategies τ1 and τ2 for G
M
X (ψ)
and GMX (θ) respectively. Now define the strategy τ for II in G
M
X (ψ∧ θ)
as follows:
for all s ∈ X, τ(χ, s) =
{
τ1(χ, s) if χ is contained in ψ;
τ2(χ, s) if χ is contained in θ.
Then (X,ψ, τ1), (X, θ, τ2) ≤M (X,ψ ∧ θ, τ) and ψ, θ are all immediate
subformulas of ψ ∧ θ; hence, by Lemma 5.9, τ is a uniform winning
strategy for II in GMX (φ), as required.
6. If φ is ∃xψ, suppose that τ is a uniform winning strategy for II in
GMX (∃xψ). Then define the function H : X → P(Dom(M))\∅ as
H(s) = {m ∈ M : (ψ, s[m/x]) ∈ τ(∃xψ, s)} and consider the following
strategy τ ′ for II in GMX[H/x](ψ):
τ ′(p) = τ(p) for all suitable p.
τ ′ is well-defined, because any position of GMX[H/x](ψ) is also a possible
position of GMX (∃xψ). Furthermore, (X [H/x], ψ, τ
′) ≤M (X, ∃xψ, τ),
and therefore τ ′ is a uniform winning strategy for II in GMX[H/x](ψ). By
induction hypothesis, this implies that M |=X[H/x] ψ, and hence that
M |=X ∃xψ.
Conversely, suppose that M |=X ∃xψ; then, there exists a function
H such that M |=X[H/x] ψ. By induction hypothesis, this means that
there exists a winning strategy τ ′ for II in GMX[H/x](ψ). Now consider
the following strategy τ for II in GMX (∃xψ):
τ(∃xψ, s) = {(ψ, s[m/x]) : m ∈ H(s)};
τ(θ, s) = τ ′(τ, s) for all τ contained in ψ and all s.
Then (X [H/x], ψ, τ ′) ≤M (X, ∃xψ, τ), and ψ is the only direct subfor-
mula of ∃xψ; hence, τ is uniform and winning, as required.
7. If φ is ∀xψ, suppose that τ is a uniform winning strategy for II in
GMX (∀xψ). Then consider the strategy τ
′ for II in GMX[M/x](ψ) given by
τ ′(θ, s) = τ(θ, s) for all θ contained in ψ and all s.
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Then (X [M/x], ψ, τ ′) ≤M (X, ∀xψ, τ), and hence τ
′ is uniform and
winning. By induction hypothesis, this means that M |=X[M/x] ψ, and
hence that M |=X ∀xψ.
Conversely, suppose that M |=X ∀xψ. Then M |=X[M/x] ψ, and hence
there exists a uniform winning strategy τ ′ for II in GMX[M/x](ψ). Then
consider the strategy τ for II in GMX (ψ) given by
τ(θ, s) = τ ′(θ, s) for all θ contained in ψ and all s.
This strategy is well-defined, since the first move of GMX (∀xψ) is Player
I’s; furthermore,
(X [M/x], ψ, τ ′) ≤M (X, ∀xψ, τ)
and therefore τ is uniform and winning, as required.
Hence, we have a game theoretic semantics which is equivalent to the lax
team semantics for inclusion/exclusion logic; and of course, the game theo-
retic semantics for inclusion and exclusion logic are simply the restrictions of
this semantics to the corresponding languages. As was argued previously, the
strict team semantics for disjunction and existential quantification is some-
what less natural when it comes to inclusion logic or I/E logic. However,
there exists a link between strict team semantics and deterministic strate-
gies:
Theorem 5.11. Let M be a first order model, let φ be an inclusion logic
formula over the signature of M and let X be a team over M whose domain
contains all free variables of φ. Then Player II has a uniform, deterministic
winning strategy in GMX (φ) if and only if M |=X φ (with respect to the strict
semantics).
Proof. The proof is by structural induction over φ, and it runs exactly as
for the lax case. The only differences occur in the cases of disjunction and
existential quantification, in which the determinism of the strategies poses a
restriction on the choices available to Player II and for which the proof runs
as follows:
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• If φ is a disjunction ψ ∨ θ, suppose that τ is a uniform, deterministic
winning strategy for II in GMX (ψ∨θ). Then define the teams Y, Z ⊆ X
as follows:
Y = {s ∈ X : τ(ψ ∨ θ, s) = {(ψ, s)}};
Z = {s ∈ X : τ(ψ ∨ θ, s) = {(θ, s)}}.
Then Y ∪ Z = X : indeed, for all s ∈ X it must be the case that
∅ 6= τ(ψ ∨ θ, s) ⊆ {(ψ, s), (θ, s)}, and hence s is in Y or in Z (or in
both). Furthermore, Y ∩ Z = ∅.
Now consider the following two strategies for II in GMY (ψ) and G
M
Z (θ)
respectively:
– τ1(p) = τ(p) for all positions p of G
M
Y (ψ);
– τ2(p) = τ(p) for all positions p of G
M
Z (θ).
Since all positions of GMY (ψ) and of G
M
Z (θ) are also positions of
GMX (ψ ∨ θ), τ1 and τ2 are well-defined. Furthermore, they are deter-
ministic, since τ is so, and (Y, ψ, τ1), (Z, θ, τ2) ≤M (X, φ, τ); therefore,
τ1 and τ2 are uniform and winning for G
M
Y (ψ) and G
M
Z (θ). By induc-
tion hypothesis, this implies that M |=Y ψ and M |=Z θ; and by the
definition of the (strict) semantics for disjunction, this implies that
M |=X ψ ∨ θ.
Conversely, suppose thatM |=X ψ∨θ, according to the strict semantics:
then, by definition, there exist teams Y and Z such that X = Y ∪ Z,
Y ∩ Z = ∅, M |=Y ψ and M |=Z θ. Then, by induction hypothesis,
there exist uniform, deterministic winning strategies τ1 and τ2 for II
in GMY (ψ) and G
M
Z (θ) respectively. Then define the strategy τ for II
in GMX (ψ ∨ θ) as follows:
– τ(ψ ∨ θ, s) =
{
{(ψ, s)} if s ∈ Y ;
{(θ, s)} if s ∈ Z.
– If p is (χ, s) and χ is contained in ψ then τ(p) = τ1(p);
– If p is (χ, s) and χ is contained in θ then τ(p) = τ2(p).
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Then, by construction, we have that
(Y, ψ, τ1), (Z, θ, τ2) ≤M (X,ψ ∨ θ, τ);
and furthermore, ψ and θ are all the immediate subformulas of ψ ∨ θ,
and τ1 and τ2 are winning and uniform by hypothesis. Therefore τ is a
uniform, deterministic winning strategy for GMX (ψ ∨ θ), as required.
• If φ is ∃xψ, suppose that τ is a uniform, deterministic winning strategy
for II in GMX (∃xψ). Then define the function F : X → Dom(M) so
that, for every s ∈ X , F (s) is the unique element m of the model such
that τ(∃xψ, s) = {(ψ, s[m/x])} and consider the following strategy τ ′
for II in GMX[F/x](ψ):
τ ′(p) = τ(p) for all suitable p.
τ ′ is well-defined, because any position of GMX[F/x](ψ) is also a possible
position of GMX (∃xψ). Furthermore, (Y [F/x], ψ, τ
′) ≤M (Y, ∃xψ, τ),
and therefore τ ′ is a uniform, deterministic winning strategy for II in
GMX[F/x](ψ). By induction hypothesis, this implies that M |=X[F/x] ψ,
and hence that M |=X ∃xψ (with respect to the strict semantics).
Conversely, suppose thatM |=X ∃xψ according to the strict semantics;
then, there exists a F such thatM |=X[F/x] ψ. By induction hypothesis,
this means that there exists a uniform, deterministic winning strategy
τ ′ for II in GMX[F/x](ψ). Now consider the following strategy τ for II
in GMX (∃xψ):
τ(∃xψ, s) = {(ψ, s[F (s)/x])};
τ(θ, s) = τ ′(τ, s) for all τ contained in ψ.
Then (X [F/x], ψ, τ ′) ≤M (X, ∃xψ, τ), and ψ is the only direct sub-
formula of ∃xψ; hence, τ is uniform, deterministic and winning, as
required.
In [13], Thomas Forster considers the distinction between deterministic and
nondeterministic strategies for the case of the logic of branching quantifiers
and points out that, in the absence of the Axiom of Choice, different truth
conditions are obtained for these two cases. In the same paper, he then
suggests that
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Perhaps advocates of branching quantifier logics and their descen-
dents will tell us which semantics [that is, the deterministic
or nondeterministic one] they have in mind.
Dependence logic, inclusion logic, inclusion/exclusion logic and indepen-
dence logic can certainly be seen as descendents of branching quantifier
logic, and the present work strongly suggests that the semantics that we
“have in mind” is the nondeterministic one. As we just saw, the determin-
istic/nondeterministic distinction in game theoretic semantics corresponds
precisely to the strict/lax distinction in team semantics; and indeed, as seen
in Subsection 3.1, for dependence logic proper (which is expressively equiva-
lent to branching quantifier logic), the lax and strict semantics are equivalent
modulo the Axiom of Choice (Proposition 3.10).
But for inclusion logic and its extensions, we have that lax and strict (and,
hence, nondeterministic and deterministic) semantics are not equivalent, even
in the presence of the Axiom of Choice (Propositions 4.7 and 4.8), and that
only the lax one satisfies Locality in the sense of Theorem 2.2 (see Proposition
4.9 and Theorems 4.10, 4.24 for the proof).
Furthermore, as stated before, Fredrik Engstro¨m showed in [9] that the
lax semantics for existential quantification arises naturally from his treatment
of generalized quantifiers in dependence logic.
All of this, in the opinion of the author at least, makes a convincing
case for the adoption of the nondeterministic semantics (or, in terms of team
semantics, of the lax one) as the natural semantics for the study of logics
of imperfect information, thus suggesting an answer to Thomas Forster’s
question.
6. Definability in I/E logic (and in independence logic)
In [26], Kontinen and Va¨a¨na¨nen characterized the expressive power of
dependence logic formulas (Theorem 2.5 here), and, in [25], Kontinen and
Nurmi used a similar technique to prove that a class of teams is definable in
team logic ([33]) if and only if it is expressible in full second order logic.
In this section, I will attempt to find an analogous result for I/E logic
(and hence, through Corollary 4.23, for independence logic). One direction
of the intended result is straightforward:
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Theorem 6.1. Let φ(~v) be a formula of I/E logic with free variables in ~v.
Then there exists an existential second order logic formula Φ(A), where A is
a second order variable with arity |~v|, such that
M |=X φ(~v)⇔M |= Φ(Rel~v(X))
for all suitable models M and teams X.
Proof. The proof is an unproblematic induction over the formula φ, and
follows closely the proof of the analogous results for dependence logic ([32])
or independence logic ([15]).
The other direction, instead, requires some care:35
Theorem 6.2. Let Φ(A) be a formula in Σ11 such that Free(Φ) = {A}, and
let ~v be a tuple of distinct variables with |~v| = Arity(A). Then there exists
an I/E logic formula φ(~v) such that
M |=X φ(~v)⇔M |= Φ(Rel~v(X))
for all suitable models M and nonempty teams X.
Proof. It is easy to see that any Φ(A) as in our hypothesis is equivalent to
the formula
Φ∗(A) = ∃B(∀~x(A~x↔ B~x) ∧ Φ(B)),
in which the variable A occurs only in the conjunct ∀~x(A~x↔ B~x). Then, as
in [26], it is possible to write Φ∗(A) in the form
∃~f ∀~x~y((A~x↔ f1(~x) = f2(~x)) ∧ ψ(~x, ~y, ~f)),
where ~f = f1f2 . . . fn, ψ(~f, x, y) is a quantifier-free formula in which A does
not appear, and each fi occurs only as f(~wi) for some fixed tuple of variables
~wi ⊆ ~x~y.
Now define the formula φ(~v) as
∀~x~y ∃~z
(∧
i
=(~wi, zi) ∧ (((~v ⊆ ~x ∧ z1 = z2) ∨ (~v | ~x ∧ z1 6= z2)) ∧ ψ
′(~x, ~y, ~z))
)
,
35The details of this proof are similar to the ones of [26] and [25].
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where ψ′(~x, ~y, ~z) is obtained from ψ(~x, ~y, ~f) by substituting each fi(~wi) with
zi, and the dependence atoms are used as shorthands for the corresponding
expressions of I/E logic.
Now we have that M |=X φ(~v)⇔M |= Φ
∗(Rel~v(X)):
Indeed, suppose that M |=X φ(~v). Then, by construction, for each i =
1 . . . n there exists a function Fi, depending only on ~wi, such that for Y =
X [M/~x~y][~F/~z]
M |=Y ((~v ⊆ ~x ∧ z1 = z2) ∨ (~v | ~x ∧ z1 6= z2)) ∧ ψ
′(~x, ~y, ~z).
Therefore, we can split Y into two subteams Y1 and Y2 such that M |=Y1
~v ⊆ ~x ∧ z1 = z2 and M |=Y2 ~v | ~x ∧ z1 6= z2.
Now, for each i define the function fi so that, for every tuple ~m of the
required arity, fi(~m) corresponds to Fi(s) for an arbitrary s ∈ X [M/~x~y] with
s(~wi) = ~m, and let o be any assignment with domain ~x~y.
Thus, if we can prove that M |=o ((Rel~v(X))~x ↔ f1(~x) = f2(~x)) ∧
ψ(~x, ~y, ~f) then the left-to-right direction of our proof is done.
First of all, suppose thatM |=o (Rel~v(X))~x, that is, that o(~x) = ~m = s(~v)
for some s ∈ X .
Then choose an arbitrary tuple of elements ~r and consider the assignment
h = s[~m/~x][~r/~y][~F/~z] ∈ Y . This h cannot belong to Y2, since h(~v) = s(~v) =
~m = h(~x), and therefore it is in Y1 and h(z1) = h(z2).
By the definition of the fi, this implies that f1(~m) = f2(~m), as required.
Analogously, suppose that M, 6|=o (Rel~v(X))~x, that is, that o(~x) = ~m 6=
s(~v) for all s ∈ X . Then pick an arbitrary such s ∈ X and an arbitrary tuple
of elements ~r, and consider the assignment
h = s[~m/~x][~r/~y][~F/~z] ∈ Y.
If h were in Y1, there would exist an assignment h
′ ∈ Y1 such that h
′(~v) =
h(~x) = ~m; but this is impossible, and therefore h ∈ Y2. Hence h(z1) 6= h(z2),
and therefore f1(~m) 6= f2(~m).
Putting everything together, we just proved that
M |=o R~x⇔ f1(~x) = f2(~x)
for all assignments o with domain ~x~y, and we still need to verify that M |=o
ψ(~x, ~y, f) for all such o.
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But this is immediate: indeed, let s be an arbitrary assignment of X , and
construct the assignment
h = s[o(~x~y)/~x~y][~F/~z] ∈ X [M/~x~y][~F/~z].
Then, sinceM |=X[M/~x~y][~F/~z] ψ
′(~x, ~y, ~z) and ψ′(~x, ~y, ~z) is first order,M |={h}
ψ′(~x, ~y, ~z); but ψ′(~x, ~y, ~f(~x~y)) is equivalent to ψ(~x, ~y, ~f) and h(zi) = f(h(~wi)) =
f(o(~wi)), and therefore
M |=o ψ(~x, ~y, ~f)
as required.
Conversely, suppose thatM |=s (Rel~v(X))~x↔ (f1(~x) = f2(~x))∧ψ(~x, ~y, ~f)
for all assignments s with domain ~x~y and for some fixed choice of the tuple
of functions ~f .
Then let ~F be such that, for all assignments h and for all i,
Fi(h) = fi(h(~wi))
and consider Y = X [M/~x~y][F/~z].
Clearly, Y satisfies the dependency conditions; furthermore, it satisfies
ψ′(~x, ~y, ~z), because for every assignment h ∈ Y and every i ∈ 1 . . . n we have
that h(zi) = Fi(h) = fi(h(~wi)).
Finally, we can split Y into two subteams Y1 and Y2 as follows:
Y1 = {o ∈ Y : o(~z1) = o(~z2)};
Y2 = {o ∈ Y : o(~z1) 6= o(~z2)}.
It is then trivially true that M |=Y1 z1 = z2 and M |=Y2 z1 6= z2, and all
that is left to do is proving that M |=Y1 ~v ⊆ ~x and M |=Y2 ~v | ~x.
As for the former, let o ∈ Y1: then, since o(z1) = o(z2), f1(o(~x)) =
f2(o(~x)).
This implies that o(~x) ∈ Rel~v(X), and hence that there exists an assign-
ment s′ ∈ X with s′(~v) = o(~x).
Now consider the assignment
o′ = s′[o(~x~y)/~x~y][~F/~z] :
since in Y the values of ~z depend only on the values of ~x~y and since o(z1) =
o(z2), we have that o
′(z1) = o
′(z2) and hence o
′ ∈ Y1 too. But o
′(~v) =
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s′(~v) = o(~x), and since o was an arbitrary assignment of Y1, this implies that
M |=Y1 ~v ⊆ ~x.
Finally, suppose that o ∈ Y2. Then, since o(z1) 6= o(z2), we have that
f1(o(~x)) 6= f2(o(~x)); and therefore, o(~x) 6∈ Rel~v(X), that is, for all assign-
ments s ∈ X it holds that s(~v) 6= o(~x). Then the same holds for all o′ ∈ Y2.
This concludes the proof.
Since by Corollary 4.23 we already know independence logic and I/E logic
have the same expressive power, this has the following corollary:
Corollary 6.3. Let Φ(A) be an existential second order formula with Free(Φ) =
A, and let ~v be any set of variables such that |~v| = Arity(A). Then there ex-
ists an independence logic formula φ(~v) such that
M |=X φ(~v)⇔M |= Φ(Rel~v(X))
for all suitable models M and teams X.
Finally, by Fagin’s Theorem ([10]) this gives an answer to Gra¨del and Va¨a¨na¨nen’s
question:
Corollary 6.4. All NP properties of teams are expressible in independence
logic.
This result has far-reaching consequences. First of all, it implies that
independence logic (or, equivalently, I/E logic) is the most expressive logic
of imperfect information which only deals with existential second order prop-
erties. Extensions of independence logic can of course be defined; but unless
they are capable of expressing some property which is not existential sec-
ond order (as, for example, is the case for the intuitionistic dependence logic
of [35], or for the BID logic of [1]), they will be expressively equivalent to
independence logic proper. As (Jouko Va¨a¨na¨nen, private communication)
pointed out, this means that independence logic is maximal among the log-
ics of imperfect information which always generate existential second order
properties of teams. In particular, any dependency condition which is ex-
pressible as an existential second order property over teams can be expressed
in independence logic: and as we will see in the next section, this entails
that such a logic is capable of expressing a great amount of the notions of
dependency considered by database theorists.
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7. Equality generating dependencies, tuple generating dependen-
cies and independence logic
In Database Theory, two of the most general notions of dependence are
tuple generating and equality generating dependencies.
In brief, a tuple generating dependency over a database relation R is a
sentence of the form
∆(A) = ∀x1 . . . xn(φ(x1 . . . xn)→ ∃z1 . . . zkψ(x1 . . . xn, z1 . . . zk))
where A is a second order variable with arity equal to the number of attributes
of R.36 and φ and ψ are conjunctions of atoms of the form A~t or ~t1 = ~t2 for
some terms ~t, ~t1 and ~t2 in the empty vocabulary and with free variables in
x1 . . . xn.
An equality generating dependency is defined much in the same way, ex-
cept that ψ is a single equality atom instead.
Then, given a domain of predication M , a relation R is said to satisfy a
(tuple-generating or equality-generating) dependency ∆ if and only if M |=
∆(R) in the usual first order sense.
As an example of the expressive power of tuple-generating and equality-
generating dependencies, let us observe that dependency atoms correspond to
equality generating dependencies and that independence atoms correspond
to tuple generating dependencies: indeed, for example, M |=X=(x, y) if and
only if
M |= ∀xy1y2~z1~z2((Rel(X))xy1~z1 ∧ (Rel(X))xy2~z2 → y1 = y2)
where |~z1| = |~z2| = |Dom(X)\{x, y}|, and M |=X y ⊥x z if and only if
M |=∀xy1y2z1z2 ~w1 ~w2(((Rel(X))xy1z1 ~w1 ∧ (Rel(X))xy2z2 ~w2)→
→ ∃~w3(Rel(X))xy1z2 ~w3).
From the main result of the previous section, it is easy to see that I/E
logic (and, as a consequence, independence logic) is capable to express all
tuple and equality generating dependencies:
36In other words, if we consider R as a relation in first order logic then Arity(A) =
Arity(R).
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Proposition 7.1. Let ∆(A) be a tuple generating or equivalent generating
dependency, and let ~v be a tuple of distinct variables with |~v| = Arity(A).
Then there exists an I/E logic (or independence logic) formula φ(~v) such
that
M |=X φ(~v)⇔ M |= ∆(Rel~v(X))
for all suitable models M and all teams X with ~v ⊆ Dom(X).
Proof. ∆(A) is definable by a first order formula, and hence by Theorem
6.2 it is expressible in I/E logic (and therefore by independence logic too, by
Corollary 4.23).
Hence, many of the properties which are discussed in the context of Database
Theory can be expressed through independence logic. The vast expressive
power of this formalism comes with a very high computational cost, of course;
but it is the hope of the author that the result of this work may provide a
justification to the study of this logic (and, more in general, of logics of
imperfect information) as a general theoretic framework for reasoning about
knowledge bases.
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